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Summary findings
After studying  the nature  and  variety  of transition  in 10  constitutes  a major  expenditure  category  for  local
regional  capitals  of Russia,  de  Melo  and  Ofer  observe  government  rather  than,  as in most  western  cities,  a
that:  major  source  of revenue.  A transition  mi this  area alone
*  All cities have  experienced  radical  changes  in their  could  revolutionize  the finances  and independence  of
institutions  and  economies  -changes  associated  on the  Russian  cities.
one  hand  with  the abolition  of central  planning  and the  The jury  is still out  on what  the  right  social and
introduction  of freer  markets,  and  on the  other  hand  industrial  policies  were  during  the  first  years of  reform.
with  political  decentralization  and  the  introduction  of  Ulyanovsk  clearly  lagged on market  reforms,  and  Saratov
local  elections.  represents  a model  of liberalization  without  institutional
These  changes  have  led to a wiide diversity  in  support.  Both  extremes  have  failed,  but  so far the  social
economic  and  social outcomes,  reflecting  differences  in  consequences  of the  Saratov  model  appear  to be worse
the central  governrnent's  (inequitable)  economic  relations  than  those  of the  Ulyanovsk  model.
with  regions  as well as differing  local  and  regional  With  the credibility  of Russia's  federal  government-
policies.  Most  northern  cities  adopted  policies  more  at an  all-time  low,  foreign  investors  have  no choice  but
consistent  with  the  central  government's  support  of  free  to rely on  the competence  and  reliability  of local  leaders,
market  reforms;  most  southern  (Red  Belt) cities pursued  especially  mayors  and governors.  They  will be  looking
more cautious, protective policies.  for evidence of accountability in the form of the rule of
* City governments are using more proactive  law, and transparency in the form of reliable public
economic policies, including interventions to save local  information. Information at the city level - often
industries. Such efforts highlight the dual nature of the  unavailable and not easily accessible -would  be very
Russian transition, characterized by a shift in power from  useful in attracting local researchers to monitor progress
central to local government as well as from public to  (as a basis for accountability) and diagnose problems (as
private enterprises.  a basis for public policy debate and political decisions).
* A major difficulty facing Russian cities is the cost of
subsidies to housing and utilities. Real estate in general
This paper - a product of Public Economics, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study
the causes and effects of fiscal  decentralization. The project was carried out in cooperation wvith  the New Economic School
(NES)  in Moscow. This is the first of two papers on the Volga cities. Copies are available free from the World Bank, 181  8
H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Hedy Sladovich, room MC2-609,  telephone 202-473-7698,  fax
202-522-1154,  Internet address hsladovichaworldbank.org.  Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web
at  http://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/home.html.  The  authors  may  be  contacted  at
rhanrottCa'erols.com or gur.ofer  vyale.edu.  August 1999.  (58 pages)
The Policy Research Workinig  Paper Series disseminates the findings of  work in progress to encourage the exchan2ge  of ideas about
development issues.  An objective of the series  is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The
papers carny the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this
paper are entirely those of  the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countries they represent.
Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination CenterTHE RUSSIAN CITY IN TRANSITION:







Martha de Melo is in the Development Research Group of the World Bank; Gur Ofer is Professor of
Economics at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. The paper is based partly on research undertaken at the
Research Center of the New Economic School in Moscow and on a separate database developed with the
assistance of Michael Haney and Plamen Yossifov. Both efforts were financed by the World Bank, and
the authors greatly appreciate the contributions  of those involved. They also thank Dan Berkowitz, Lev
Freinkman, Philip Hanson, Tim Heleniak, Andrei Markov, John Mikesell, and Valery Nekhaev for their
comments and assistance.I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we look at the nature and variety of transition in ten regional capitals
situated along the Volga River. Under the old regime cities were at the lowest level of the
planning hierarchy, and they played an obedient and virtually uniform role. Now,
although federal and regional politics are still predominant, many regional capitals and
other large cities have gained some autonomy and started to develop independent
municipal policies. Our approach is to first look at differences at the local level in initial
conditions and in the pace and pattern of reform. By providing comparative rankings, we
then suggest how such differences may have affected socioeconomic outcomes.  Thus,
our focus is on the role and comparative experience of cities, as microcosms of change.
Information on Russian regions, or "federation subjects", is available with
increasing ease. Goskomstat published a two volume statistical document on "Russia's
Regions" in 1997, and Bradshaw and Hanson 1998 provides a convenient review of the
English-language literature on political, economic and social transition in the Russian
regions.  No detailed national statistics for regional capitals have appeared, however,
since the publication of Socioeconomic Statistics of Capitals of Republics, Krais and
Oblasts of the Russian Federation (1994). As a result, data at the city level-with  the
exception of Moscow and St. Petersburg-are  scant and difficult to come by, and little
research has been undertaken.
For this study, we draw on a variety of Russian and international sources
including local statistical bulletins, news articles, and unpublished case studies and other
papers by Russian researchers, as well as better known and more accessible published
materials. Initial conditions are defined as of 1990, the last year of relative stability in
prices and institutions before the 1991/92 political and economic upheavals. The latest
comprehensive data are for 1996, permitting an evaluation of the first six years of
transition.  For those who know Russia, a cautionary word about the reliability of data
may not be necessary. For others, we acknowledge such difficulties as problematic price
deflators and alternative values for the same variable found in different sources.
Our findings, which we characterize as concluding hypotheses, are that reform is
associated with favorable initial conditions and that both reform and favorable initial
conditions are associated with relatively successful economic outcomes.  The exceptions
are typically where access to extra resources enhances outcomes or where weak
government undermines success. We note that the association between reforms and
outcomes would be even stronger were it not for time lags and the lack of comprehensive
indicators other than the average wage to measure economic outcomes. As might be
expected, the five Red Belt cities have been more cautious on reform and less successful
in economic outcomes than the other cities, but exceptions exist to this generalization. In
particular, Saratov and especially Volgograd are more reformist and appear to be
influenced by a growth pole led by Kazan and Samara.
Section II below looks at initial conditions in the Volga capitals in 1990, shortly
before the break up of the Soviet Union. Available data suggest that in many ways these
cities were not very different from the Russian average and not dramatically different
Ifrom each other. Variations in the importance and structure of industry did exist,
however, and could have been expected to affect success during the transition to a market
economy. Section III focuses on differences through 1996 in specific economic
policies-namely,  price controls, fiscal policies, privatization, and business development.
In order to place these policies in context, we review in Section IV the nature of political
change and the role of local politics in policy formation. Section V presents the available
indicators of economic and social outcomes and the implied changes during the first six
years of transition. And finally, Section VI explores the relationship between initial
conditions, policies and outcomes and offers some general observations about transition,
based on the experience of these ten regional capitals. A brief discussion of partial data
available for 1997 and 1998 adds a more recent perspective to this evaluation.
II. INITIAL CONDITIONS
The Volga cities included here stretch from northwest of Moscow to the Caspian
sea (Figure 1) and span three of the 11 traditional areas of Russia-Tver  and Yaroslavl
(Central Region); Nizhny Novgorod and Cheboksary (Volga-Vyatka Region); and Kazan,
Ulyanovsk, Samara, Saratov, Volgograd, and Astrakhan (Volga Region). The Volga
River has been a north-south trade route for many centuries, and there is substantial
similarity among the cities. All the Volga cities are old cities with deep historical and
cultural roots, several first established in the 11th  (Yaroslavl), 12th (Tver) and 13th
(Nizhni) centuries. Each one is the capital of its region and has a population of 0.4 to 1.4
million people; typically the capital accounts for about a third of the region's population.
Historical access to similar information, technology, and cultural influences suggests that
there would be less diversity in the experience of these cities than cities more varied in
size or more widely dispersed across the Russian Federation.
Tables 1 and 2 present a variety of information on the Volga cities as of 1989/90,
these being years of relative stability and therefore a useful point of departure. Cities are
ordered from top to bottom according to their location along the Volga River. Looking
first at Table 1, five of the cities are relatively large, around a million population, and five
are smaller, close to a half million. City per capita incomes are not known, but average
monthly wages in the cities were very similar in 1990, and slightly below the Russian
average. The highest average wages (Saratov and Tver) are less than 5 percent above the
lowest (Samara and Cheboksary), and available data on living standards fail to reveal the
existence of any clear hierarchy in the standard of living. 1  For example, the lowest
infant mortality is found in the city of Cheboksary, which also has the lowest per  capita
trade in consumer goods and services. Only Samara seems to stand out as unfortunate,
with the highest infant mortality and a low per capita trade in consumer goods and
services. This observed uniformity in the standard of living among the Volga cities must
surprise even experienced Soviet "hands".
IMonthly  wages at the regional level, which are typically lower than wages in the capital city, have a
spread of less than 10 percent, but per  capita regional income shows a variation of close to 25 percent
between Yaroslavl Oblast, with the highest income, and Chuvashia. The higher income variation is
explained in part by lower employment rates for the total population in Chuvashia.
2Although most Volga cities were major industrial centers with many large finns,
the size and structure of industry varied substantially. Industrial employment shares,
shown in Table 1, were particularly high in Cheboksary, Kazan, and Ulyanovsk and low
in Astrakhan and Tver. Major sub-sectors by city were as follows:
*  Energy, petrochemicals, and chemicals: Volgograd, Yaroslavl, Samara, Saratov,
Kazan.
*  Military manufacturing and research: Nizhny, Kazan, Samara, Saratov.
*  Machine-building: Ulyanovsk and Nizhni (cars); Volgograd and Cheboksary
(tractors); Saratov and Kazan (planes); Astrakhan and Yaroslavl (ships).
*  Metallurgy: Volgograd.
e  Consumer goods (textiles,  food  industry): Astrakhan, Tver, Cheboksary.
Table 2 gives a more detailed breakdown of the Volga cities' industrial structure,
based on the industrial census of Russian enterprises in 1989. The wide differences in
size and structure of industry are likely explanations of diverse outcomes, given the many
severe shocks suffered by industry during transition. One shock was the 1992 price
liberalization, associated with opening the Russian internal market to international trade.
It resulted in a large increase in the relative price of energy and other raw materials that
in turn raised input costs for heavy industry. A second shock was the drop in central
government procurement orders, which affected the demand for military production and
research, construction and industrial machinery, as well as cars and planes for civilian
use. A third shock was the disintegration of the pervasive distribution network organized
by the center. Most enterprises had no internal sales departments or marketing strategies.
On the supply side, competition from imports affected all sectors, but especially light
industry, as the domestic variety and quality of textiles, leather and other light industry
goods was poor, in part due to obsolete equipment. Using an ex post analysis of changes
in quantity, price, investment and employment, Ivanov 1998b shows that light industry
and machinery/metal-working  became the two least competitive sectors in Russia as a
whole.
Two other characteristics reveal substantial differences among the cities, but their
implications are not clear. One is the share of defense employment in total industrial
employment, which was high in Nizhni, Kazan, and Samara. On the one hand, defense
industries present a huge task for restructuring; on the other hand, the high level of
human capital associated with defense industries would seem to provide an advantage.
Nizhni was classified as a closed city during most of the Soviet era, and restrictions to
foreigners also applied to Saratov, Samara, and Volgograd, presumably because of the
sensitivity of the type of military production there. The other characteristic is a strong
agricultural base.  Taking the ratio of agricultural to industrial production in 1995 as an
indicator, four cities-namely,  Tver, Cheboksary, Saratov, and Astrakhan-are  located in
regions with a relatively strong agricultural base. Is this an advantage or a disadvantage?
On the one hand, relatively high inter-regional transport costs mean that a strong
3agricultural base can help keep low food prices in the capital city and promote low
industrial wages. On the other hand, agriculture is generally unreformed and cash poor,
adding additional pressure on available public revenues. In our initial evaluation, we will
assume the advantages and disadvantages of these two characteristics are offsetting.
Finally, some particular advantages should be mentioned. Two regions, namely
Kazan and Saratov, have favorable natural resources (primarily oil) at the regional level
and might be expected to exploit such resources more aggressively under a market
economy. 2 Nizhni, Samara, Yaroslavl, and Tver all have a favorable geographic location
at the intersection of important rivers, roads, rail lines and (for Samara) pipelines.
Nizhni, for example, was famous in the 19th  century for its annual fairs, revived in 1991.
As of 1990, however, neither these nor other initial conditions discussed above appear to
be associated systematically with indicators of living standards, namely infant mortality
and per capita availability of consumer goods and services.
What might be the expectations of success based on these initial conditions?
Table 3 provides a ranking based on four criteria:
*  Low share of industrial employment in the urban labor force (low is under 35 percent;
high is over 45 percent).
*  Low share of industry in the two least competitive sectors, light industry and
machinery/metalworking (low is under 40 percent; high is over 60 percent).
*  Low industrial concentration (low is under 25 in any one sub-sector; high is over 45
percent).
*  Special advantage from location or natural resources.
Based on these criteria, Cheboksary and Ulyanovsk would be expected to encounter the
most severe problems with adjustment during transition. Nizhni and Kazan would be
expected to perform significantly better, but worse than the five cities receiving a rank of
four.  Saratov, with a rank of five, stands out as having an edge on success.
III. ECONOMIC  POLICIES
During the early years of transition, cities evolved from a center for purely
administrative activities to a locus for incipient policy formation. But the degree of
independence varied among cities as well as over time; and by end-1996 it was in fact
still difficult to distinguish city policies from region policies, particularly in the republics.
Thus our indicators of "city policies" will inevitably reflect regional influence, if not
control. Nevertheless, we look here at four policy categories where cities have at least
some leeway: pricing, fiscal policy, privatization, and support for business development.
For this last category we use indicators of small-scale enterprise development and foreign
2 Rich  gas and oil deposits  were  discovered  in Astrakhan  in 1994,  but this  discovery  would  not affect  the
period  considered  here.
4investment. A summary ranking of cities by policy reform is provided and followed by a
discussion of the underlying political landscape.
Pricing
During the Soviet era, government subsidies reduced consumer prices
substantially below costs in two main categories: food products and services, including
housing/utilities/public transport, as well as cultural, household and personal services.
Food prices were reduced through heavy subsidies to the agricultural sector. Rent and
prices for utilities and public transport were reduced by explicit or implicit government
subsidies and by direct provision of housing and utilities by enterprises. Underlying
subsidies were provided through low energy prices.
The 1992 price liberalization eliminated subsidies from the center for almost all
marketed goods, including most food products. Local governments tried to maintain low
food prices by a variety of methods, many with adverse budget implications. Meanwhile,
although prices for municipal services rose, the rate of subsidization actually increased
because of high general inflation and a rise in the relative price of energy. The resulting
budgetary pressure forced local governments to gradually give up some controls and
increase the extent of cost recovery. Direct pressure from federal and regional
governments, the development of black markets, and difficulties in maintaining local
autarky also reinforced this trend. By 1997, most but not all price controls for market
goods were removed. 3
Food prices. Methods for controlling food prices have included: restrictions on
exports to other regions (Ulyanovsk, Saratov), despite a federal decree that forbade such
restrictions; administrative  price controls; ceilings on production profits and trade
markups (Ulyanovsk, Astrakhan, Yaroslavl); and requirements for enterprises to supply
part of their production at lower prices, sometimes as an offset to taxes. With prices
below market clearing levels, rationing was necessarily introduced in a number of
places. 4 The Volga cities, and corresponding regions, were part of this process, but each
region and city implemented its own specific policies in accordance with its ideology,
ability and perceived needs.
3The  topic of price  control  on  marketed  goods,  especially  food,  is covered  in many  papers,  including
Berkowitz  (1996),  Berkowitz  and  DeJong  (1998),  and  de Masi  and Koen  (1996).
4More recently,  local  officials  have  used  restrictions,  including  taxes  and quality  requirements,  on regional
imports  to keep  prices  higher;  the most common  example  is restriction  of vodka  sales  in such  areas  as
Tatarstan,  Nizhni,  and  Tver.  Here the objective  is to  protect  producers,  typically  public  enterprises,  rather
than consumers.
5Prices in Ulyanovsk city were clearly lower than elsewhere, with VoIgograd also
showing the effects of extensive price controls. Nizhni and Samara had the highest prices,
with prices in Saratov, Cheboksary and Kazan falling in-between. At the local level,
price subsidies have been typically financed from extra-budgetary funds. Special taxes,
including those on new businesses, covered part of the cost. In order to control for over-
consumption, Ulyanovsk also developed a very elaborate rationing system that was
abolished only in July 1996.
But direct food subsidies have also been partially financed at the regional level.
In Ulyanovsk, for example, food subsidies absorbed more than half of the regional
administration funds for social protection, thus accounting for 5 to 10 percent of the
budget at that level. More commonly, regional governments have devoted a large share
of their budget to agricultural subsidies as a complement to direct price controls, although
such support partially reflects the relative size of the agricultural sector in the region. The
largest supporters of agriculture, as indicated by expenditure shares in the regional
consolidated budget for 1995-96, were Tatarstan (18 percent) and Ulyanovsk (16
percent), compared to a Russian average of about 16 percent. And Tatarstan had already
reduced its state order for grain to 70 percent of production, allowing farmers to sell on
the local market, because agriculture was previously absorbing 25 percent of the regional
budget. Although providing little or no direct price controls on food, Saratov spent a
relatively large amount (13 percent) on agriculture, partly as direct state investment, and
also imposed export restrictions to reduce food prices.
Other  prices. Of course, food prices are not the only prices subsidized or
otherwise controlled. Appendix Table 5 gives prices of basic municipal services as of
end 1996 in 8 Volga cities.  On average and with the exception of natural gas, Ulyanovsk
prices are again at the lower end of the spectrum. Kazan's remaining price controls are
financed in part by large subsidies to important state enterprises. Prices appear to be
highest on average in Niznhi.
Overallprice controls. Baranchuk 1998 provides three alternative rankings of
price controls in the Volga cities: the proportion of goods and services under price
control; the severity of the price control method; and deviations from the national average
of a comprehensive ranking based on direct price subsidies, fixed or maximum prices,
rationing, limitations on food industry profitability and price mark-ups (Table 4).5 All
three rankings show that-with  the exception of Saratov, vvhere  price controls have been
reduced-the  "Red Belt" regions have the highest price control. The five "Red Belt"
regions, defined as favoring the Communist Party candidate Zuganov over Yeltsin in
both 1st and 2nd rounds of the 1996 presidential elections, are Astrakhan, Volgograd,
Saratov, Ulyanovsk and Cheboksary.
5These  rankings were originally provided in TACIS 1996 as regional indicators, however the surveys were
taken in the capital cities.
6These rankings are corroborated by data in Appendix Table 6. The cost of a
standard set of 25 basic food items in Ulyanovsk was still the lowest of the Volga capitals
in 1996, although by 1997 it was only slightly below costs in Kazan and Cheboksary. The
highest costs were in Samara in 1996 and in Samara and Astrakhan in 1997, although
their prices were still slightly lower than the Russian average. Berkowitz and DeJong
1998 show that substantial inter-regional price differentials can be explained by supply
and transportation costs, but very large differences, such as between Ulyanovsk or Kazan
in the middle Volga and Saratov or Astrakhan further south, clearly result from food-
price controls.
Appendix Table 6 also shows the cost of the monthly subsistence minimum
calculated for the regions starting in 1994. Although varying in its composition among
regions, this measure is of interest as it covers a broader category of expenditures than the
25 food items.  Both measures show that costs are highest in Samara and lowest in
Ulyanovsk.  They also show that prices are relatively lower in the cities of Astrakhan and
Volgograd than in their surrounding regions and relatively higher in Nizhni than in its
surrounding region. This difference is consistent with the city rankings on price controls
showing higher price controls in Astrakhan and Volgograd than in Nizhni.  In Section IV,
the broader basket will be used as an alternative deflator to the regional CPIs for
outcomes measured in current rubles.
Fiscal Policy at the Municipal Level
Under the soviet regime, cities had no independent policy authority, but they
nevertheless provided consumer goods and services such as food markets, laundries, and
theaters.  And they had primary responsibility for public services. Even so, some public
services, such as education (primarily  kindergartens), health, housing, utilities, and even
some public transportation and road building fell under the responsibility of large
enterprises operating in the cities. In most cases, the enterprises provided these services
only to their employees, but sometimes, as in transportation, the enterprises provided
services for the entire population. The evolving role of fiscal policy in the Russian city is
discussed in more detail in de Melo, Ofer and Yossifov 1999. Here, we focus on a small
number of fiscal policy indicators of reform.
Revenue issues. In fact, it is quite difficult to identify useful indicators.  On the
revenue side, there are three main sources: shared taxes, transfers, and own revenues.
None is a clear indicator of fiscal policy at the municipal level.  Shared taxes depend on
the annually negotiated sharing arrangements  between the city's surrounding region and
the federal government, as well as on the sharing arrangements  between the region and
the city. City officials may influence such arrangements, which vary across regions and
cities; but they do not control them. They are sometimes revised during the course of the
year, but less frequently in recent years.. Similarly, city officials have little control over
transfers from higher levels of government. It is likely that cities put more effort into
collecting taxes-such  as income and property taxes-that  allot them high shares.
The third source, own revenues, is relatively small and may be maintained off
budget. Mitchneck 1994, for example, shows that extra-budgetary funds accounted for
7an estimated 11 percent of all expenditures by the city of Yaroslavl. The incentives for
cities to operate extra-budgetary funds are to maintain legal control and to hide the size of
their resources from regional authorities that might otherwise reduce their tax shares. As
documented by Mitchneck, such funds are financed by fines, revenues from privatization,
rental of municipal property, profits from direct economic activity, and carryover from a
previous year budget surplus. Zhuravskaya 1998, however, finds that extra-budgetary
funds are either very small or non-existent at the local level, partly because there are no
stable sources of revenues for such funds. Acknowledging some ambiguity in the
meaning of the size of own revenues on budget, we nevertheless use such revenues from
property and other taxes as an indicator of municipal tax effort and hence municipal
reform.
Expenditure issues. The major categories of expenditure are "national economy"
and public services such as education and health. National economy expenditures are
associated with the functions of the former soviet government, which supported
production through subsidies and also subsidized housing and utilities to middle-income
families. A declining ratio of expenditures on "national economy" to expenditures on
health and education has been seen by some as reflecting an important aspect of reform in
Russian cities (Zhuravskaya 1998, Halligan 1995),  but it is not an unambiguous indicator.
This is because it is not always clear whether the subsidies under national economy are
the old style production and housing subsidies or more recent attempts to compensate
enterprises for their support of social services. Social spending by Russian enterprises on
education and health, as well as on public housing and transport, was large prior to
transition, representing as much as 20 percent of gross wage costs (Freinkrnan and
Starodubrovskaya 1996). The transfer of such social spending from enterprises to
municipalities is an important aspect of reform, but the acceptance of financial
responsibility for these services by municipalities prior to the transfer was also important,
hence the ambiguity.
Another problem, making budgetary expenditures difficult to assess, is the
valuation of revenues and expenditures made in kind. At the regional level, budgetary
non-cash revenues for the first 10 months of 1997 ranged from a low of 6 percent in
Moscow City to a high of 76 percent in Chuvashia (MFK Renaissance 1998b, p. 22).
Most of the Volga regions had non-cash revenues of around 50 percent; the size of non-
cash revenues and the particular prices chosen to apply to in-kind transactions have
implications for city as well as regional budgets. Typically prices chosen to value in-kind
transactions are some multiple of the market price and so tend to inflate these budgets.
Indicators of reform. As adequate budgetary data are not available for individual
capital cities, we rely on budgetary data for Cities under Regional Jurisdiction (CRJs),
supplemented by specialized reports, to detect changes in municipal finances. CRJs are
typically cities with more than 25,000 people (see Appendix Table 2 for CRJ population
by region). They are strongly affected by the capital cities, which in 1996 accounted on
average for 62 percent of the CRJ population, although this varies by region.
CRJ data are used to obtain the two indicators of fiscal reforrn shown in Table 5.
The "tax effort" indicator is calculated as the per capita collection of "property tax" plus
8"other taxes" by CRJs in 1996 as a percent of the annual wage in the capital city.6 Cities
retain 50 percent of the property tax and so have a strong incentive for collection; other
tax shares are much lower.  And cities retain a hundred percent of "other taxes", which
they initiate. Thus high collections of these taxes are likely to indicate a pro-active city
administration. Interestingly, the highest tax effort occurs in Saratov with one of the
lowest wages and in Kazan with one of the highest wages.  The lowest tax effort is in
Astrakhan. High taxes can of course discourage business activity, but own revenues do
not make a large difference in the overall tax burden.  Poor tax design and collection
methods are likely to be reflected in the indicators for favorable business environment
discussed below.
The "housing subsidy burden" is calculated as the per capita housing subsidy in
Volga CRJs in 1996 as a percent of the annual wage in the capital city. Unlike "tax
effort", which is seen as a reformist policy, a high housing subsidy indicates a lagging
effort to reduce undesirable subsidies for mostly middle-class housing and utilities. It can
also indicate lagging housing privatization, as privatization reduces the burden. The
"housing subsidy burden" indicator is highest for Saratov and lowest for Ulyanovsk and
Cheboksary.
Privatization
City govenuments  were responsible for privatization of their housing stock and of
small and medium enterprises. Privatization rates are therefore an indication of local
government efforts to establish competitive markets with clear property rights. Housing
privatization also helps relieve some of the fiscal burden of cities.
Housing privatization. As a result of the first wave of apartment privatization, the
ownership structure of city housing changed radically. In Samara, for example, half the
housing stock in 1991 was owned by enterprises and more than a third by the city; only
15 percent was in private hands-individual  townhouses, rural houses incorporated into
the city as it expanded over time, and cooperatives. By 1996, half the housing stock was
private.  But privatization rates are actually a better indicator of privatization policy than
ownership structure, because of variations in the initial level of private ownership. Table
6 shows that by 1996 the Russian average of 36 percent for housing privatization was
surpassed only in Volgograd. It was almost achieved in Nizhni, Astrakhan, and Tver,
followed by Saratov, Samara, and Yaroslavl. Cheboksary, and especially Kazan and
Ulyanovsk, trail far behind.
Small-scale privatization. Most Volga cities privatized their small-scale
enterprises early (I 992-93).  The most common initial approach was to lease shops or
small companies, often with an option to buy; many lessees exercised this option. After
several years, tenders and auctions were used to achieve privatization. In Nizhni,
Volgograd, Samara, Yaroslavl and Tver, international agencies, such as the IFC, the
EBRD and the EU, were involved in privatization, and privatization proceeded relatively
6Non-tax revenues are excluded from this measure as it is somewhat arbitrary whether such revenues are
included in the budget or maintained off-budget; in any case, they are small.
9quickly. In Ulyanovsk, small-scale privatization started later than most Volga cities, with
the main wave occurring in 1994-95.  And in Cheboksary, only 58 percent of the original
municipally owned enterprises were reported as privatized by mid-1997.  There are,
however, no readily available, comparable statistics for all the Volga cities on small-scale
privatization, although cities that privatized early and quickly are likely to score well on
the indicator for small enterprise development discussed below.
Support for the Business Sector
City governments are partly responsible for the creation of a friendly and
supportive environment for business sector development. Such an enviromnent typically
includes a variety of activities that are difficult to measure, much less to rank, including
encouragement of banking and other financial services, regulations for registration and
licensing of business activities, business information and training, and support for large-
scale enterprises, whether or not privatized by federal or regional authorities. Some
indicators, such as the tax regime, are inappropriate in that they are largely dictated by
federal and regional governments. Here we use the number of small enterprises per 1000
residents and foreign investment as indicators of city support for the local business
sector.
Small enterprise development. Since 1991, there has been an explosion of
registered businesses all over Russia.  Some were new independent businesses, and others
were small and medium enterprises privatized by the city government. The growth of
these two categories depends in part on local govermnent privatization policies.  In
addition, many small businesses were not registered at all (see, for example, Yakovlev
1998). According to most statistics, between a half and two thirds of all small businesses
are in trade and restaurants, and the rest are divided between consumer services,
manufacturing and construction. Most of them are therefore the market network itself.
The regional data on small enterprises per thousand residents is considered an
adequate proxy for local government support for small businesses, since most small-scale
enterprises are in the cities. Additional data on the total number of enterprises and
organizations by region are given in Appendix Table 7. During the last years of the
Soviet Union, 1990-91, most Volga regions had about two enterprises per thousand
people, resembling almost a "planning norm". Only Nizhni and Samara deviate on the
lower end with significantly less enterprises, and Tver on the upper end with significantly
more. By 1996 the total number of enterprises was at least five times higher across the
board, and particularly high in Samara, Volgograd and Saratov. Samara, and Volgograd
regions, together with Yaroslavl, also led in the number of small enterprises. The
laggards were Ulyanovsk, Chuvashia, and Tatarstan and also, surprisingly, Tver and
Nizhni. As can be seen from the table, some Volga regions have more enterprises than
the Russian average, and most other regions are near the average. And yet the Russian
average, even the Moscow average, is not considered high by East European standards
(Frye and Shleifer 1997).
As with other indicators, the small enterprise indicator must be interpreted with
caution. Most Volga regions show a decline in the number of small enterprises during
101996, possibly because of consolidation of registries. In any case, Hanson 1997 points
out that the changes between 1990 and 1996 are difficult to interpret, as many of the state
shops providing local goods and services were not separate accounting units during the
Soviet period. Hanson also notes that house building in the countryside around the cities
of Samara and Togliatti and new business and consumer services such as travel agencies
and cafes are extensive, but the regional Goskomstat has no information on such
developments.
Foreign investment. Foreign investment, particularly in the form of real
investment in joint ventures with a local producer, can be an effective vehicle for
enterprise restructuring (see city case studies on Samara, Ulyanovsk, Volgograd, and
Kazan). In addition to financing, which is scarce and costly in Russia, foreign investors
bring with them modem technology, modem management and ready-made export lines.
By the end of 1996, Moscow alone had more than half all the joint ventures in Russia and
had also received about 70 percent of the cumulative foreign investment, including
portfolio investment. While it is true that some Moscow joint ventures benefit, or even
take place in, other regions, there is no question that the regions are less attractive to
investors.
In the Volga region, foreign investors are attracted by oil, gas, petrochemicals,
aerospace and automotive industries. However, actual investment appears to reflect the
local business environment as much as the presence of such assets. Nizhni quickly
gained attention by attracting foreign investment and international support for enterprise
restructuring and early privatizations; but Samara and Tatarstan appear to have matched,
if not overtaken, Nizhni in offering a favorable business environment and good public
relations. Since January 1995 Tatarstan provides exemption from local profits and
property taxes for 3 to 5 years to companies with at least 30 percent foreign equity
totaling $1million or more. It also authorizes foreign investors to own land and
buildings. President Shamiev is trying to attract domestic as well as foreign funds by
floating special investment and oil bonds and selling government equity stakes in
industrial companies. In Samara, local government officials welcome foreign
businessmen enthusiastically and describe themselves as facilitators rather than
controllers of business partners. Astrakhan also has substantial international contacts, but
foreign investmnent  remains low.
Available data show that Tatarstan and Nizhni regions received the most foreign
investment per capita in 1997, followed by Samara (Appendix Table 8). Yaroslavl,
Volgograd and Saratov received about half the Russian Federation average, while
Astrakhan, Ulyanovsk, Chuvashia and Tver receiv-ed  very little. Nizhni and Tatarstan also
show the highest regional output by joint ventures (also Appendix Table 8), followed
distantly by Yaroslavl, Saratov and Volgograd. The lowest number ofjoint ventures and
their lowest real outputs are in Chuvashia, Tver, Ulyanovsk and Astrakhan.7
7Since  early 1995, Tver region has provided a five-year exemption from profit, property and land taxes to
private investors. Ninety percent of the region's joint ventures are located in the city of Tver, which has
participated in a number of foreign supported projects aimed at the transforming the city to be compatible
11Available city data for 1995 and 1996 in Table 6 show that typically the capital
receives higher foreign investmentper capita than the region as a whole, although this is
not the case for Kazan and Samara where some of the largest enterprises are located
elsewhere. Of course, foreign investment can vary substantially from year to year, so we
also looked at studies that have ranked the general investment environment in Russian
regions. All put Samara, Tatarstan, Nizhni and, more recently Saratov, at the top of the
list, followed by Yaroslavl Volgograd and Tver, with Ulyanovsk, Chuvashia and
Astrakhan at the bottom.8 This ranking generally substantiates the use of the foreign
investment indicator as a proxy for favorable business environment.
Overall Ranking On Policy Reforms
Table 7 provides a rough ranking of policy reform and also cities, concentrating
on indicators for which some comparative data are available. The comprehensive
Berkowitz/Baranchuk indicator is used for price liberalization. Tax effort and "housing
subsidy containment" (the inverse of the "housing subsidy burden" in Table 5) are used
for fiscal policy reform. Housing privatization, number of small-scale enterprises per
1000 residents and foreign investment levels are used as indicators of support for local
business development. The rankings in the right-hand column suggest that Yaroslavl and
Samara are the most active reformers, followed by Tver, Nizhni, and Volgograd. Kazan
and Saratov are in the middle, less reformist than those just mentioned but more refonmist
than Cheboksary and Astrakhan. Ulyanovsk is at the bottom of the list.
IV. THE UNDERLYING POLITICAL LANDSCAPE 9
Since independence in late 1991, the political power of Russian regions, and also
cities, has increased substantially. Initially local heads of government were appointed, but
central legislation provided for democratic elections of governors, mayors, regional
parliaments, and city councils. The regions, and among them the republics, led the way
with Tatarstan holding presidential elections in June 1991 and Chuvashia holding
elections in 1994. For the Volga oblasts, political decentralization gained momentum in
December 1995, when Nizhni, Tver, and Yaroslavl joined nine other oblasts for the first
gubernatorial elections allowed by Yeltsin. These regions were expected to retain
Yeltsin's appointees in office, and they did. The transition to democratically elected
leaders was completed in all the regions by early 1997.
As of August 1997, six of the ten surrounding regions of the Volga capitals had
signed a bilateral "power-sharing" agreement with the federal government. The first was
Tatarstan, and the five others in chronological order are: Chuvashia, Nizhni, Tver,
with a market economy.
8 See for example Expert 1996 and MFK Renaissance 1998. Volchkova (1997) reports 212 joint ventures
in Samara, as well as high involvement of large Western companies (Nestle, GM, Corning), and loans from
both the World Bank and EBRD.
9This  section draws on information from news reports, city case studies, MFK Renaissance (1 998b),
Zlotnik (1996), and Friedgut and Hahn (1994).
12Saratov, and Samara. Typically such agreements cover budgetary relations, state
property, regulation of branches of industry such as defense or agro-industry, ownership
and use of natural resources. Both political and economic factors lie behind the impetus
to conclude them. Tartarstan negotiated the greatest degree of independence and has been
able to retain more than 80 percent of the taxes collected in its territory (OECD 1997).
"Surplus" regions such as Samara, Nizhni, and Tatarstan that did not depend on
budgetary transfers from the center, became even stronger.
Independence of Cities
Before 1996, most mayors were appointed by regional governors, with
confirmation by the city council and then by the regional assembly. The most notable
exception was Samara, where the first freely contested elections for mayor and city
council took place in June 1994. Sysuev, the incumbent, was elected and then reelected
in 1996, both times with a substantial majority. His independent political mandate
affected the relationship between the city and regional administration, so that Samara
under Sysuev was relatively independent. Cities such as Saratov, Ulyanovsk, Yaroslavl,
Kazan, and Cheboksary were much less so.
On balance, the independence of cities appears to be increasing. As one
indication, surveys in Samara in 1994 and 1996 showed a dramatic increase in the
percent of citizens saying city authorities have more influence on local developments
than regional or federal authorities (Romanov and Tartakovskaya 1998). The reality is, of
course, that elections have given local officials a local power base, with which they can
work to resist pressures from the region or the center. The increasing influence of local
businessmen is probably a positive development in that politicians are encouraged to be
more pragmatic, but in some cities mayors have allied themselves to some factions within
the business community, thereby angering others.  Councils in cities such as Nizhni,
Tver, and Yaroslavl are made up of many small interest groups, making governance more
difficult.
Common Characteristics of Local Leaders
Who are these local leaders and what characteristics do they demonstrate? Table
8 provides a list of governors and mayors of the Volga regions and capital cities, with
indications of their political orientation. Two common characteristics can be observed.
First, many of these leaders are strong, authoritative  personalities, adept at public
relations and image-making. And this characteristic spans the entire political spectrum.
It includes conservatives such as Goryachev in Ulyanovsk and Shabunin in Volgograd. It
includes reformers such as Nemtsov in Nizhni, Titov in Samara and Lysitsin in
Yaroslavl. And it includes more recently elected populists such as Limanskii in Samara
and Sklyarov in Nizhni.
Second, many successful local leaders have avoided association with any political
ideology in favor of a more pragmatic approach, including a "hands on" involvement in
the local economy. At the city level, Samara's Sysuev campaigned successfully on the
basis of his business skills rather than any specific policies or political affiliation. In
13Kazan, most of the city council members are directors of enterprises, and polls show that
the electorate has become increasingly apolitical. At the regional level, Fyodorov of
Chuvashia campaigned as a "rule of law" advocate in a region with strong ethnically
based political positions. And Samara region's Titov, a member of Our Home is Russia, is
well known for his pragmatism and professional skills.
Implications for Reform
At the regional level, reform may be as much a means to an end as an end in
itself. Malyakin 1997 says Volga regions can be classified into two groups. In the first
group, the governor forms a "power pyramid", or alliance, with the center and is accepted
by the local elite. He is rewarded by the center represented by Yeltsin with virtual
autonomy, providing a bias in favor of reform. 10 This occurred in Samara and Nizhni
under Nemtsov, although Nemtsov complicated the model by becoming a self-publicist.
The two republics, Tatarstan and Chuvashia, also belong to this group.  The second group
is characterized by weak leadership and thus leads to meddling by the center.  Saratov is
cited as an example of the second group prior to the appointment in early 1996 of
Ayatskov, who brings Saratov into the first group.
The two-group analysis helps to explain the political evolution of some of the
"Red Belt" regions.  A quick look at Table 7 shows that the five Red Belt cities
(Astrakhan, Volgograd, Saratov, Ulyanovsk and Cheboksary) have on average followed
the conservative political orientation of the local population and have undertaken far less
reform than non-Red Belt cities. But Volgograd under Shabunin and more recently
Saratov under Ayatskov have broken out of the traditionalist mold, with more progressive
reform profiles similar to those of Nizhni and Kazan. Volgograd gets high marks on
reform for small business development and housing privatization. Saratov has been a
leader in price liberalization and local resource mobilization. And Saratov region elected
a non-communist duma at the end of 1997 and is leading in breakthrough land legislation.
It may be deserting the Red Belt in terms of some market reforms, but these reforms are
achieved through authoritarian means normally associated with conservative policies.
Moreover, the stick of the hard budget constraint in Saratov has not been balanced by the
carrot of good government, which needs to create the right institutional setting and
service support for businesses. Recently Saratov received the lowest rank of six Volga
cities on business environment and municipal services from a small survey of businesses,
and it is unlikely that governance was better in 1996.11
At the city level, elected mayors begin to differentiate themselves more clearly
from the regional leadership starting in 1996. Where differences emerge, the city
leadership appears to be somewhat more reform-minded. This is the case, for example, in
Ulyanovsk where Marusin won the race for mayor over Ermakov in 1996 partly because
he was seen as more independent of the governor. Chekov, the communist mayor of
IO  Still, some  attempts  of assertive  independence,  such  as Volgograd's  attempt  to introduce  its own taxes,
were successfully  quashed  by the center.
See de Melo,  Ofer, and  Yossifov  (1999).
14Volgograd is more refonn-oriented than Maksyuta, a communist who in 1996 defeated
Shabunin, the previous governor of Volgograd oblast. Shabunin was initially moderate
traditional but became increasingly autocratic as the economy deteriorated and orthodox
communists came to power.  Tver may be seen as intermediary, with Belousov popular
but constrained.
The prevalence of pragmatism over ideology can favor market reforms. In some
cases, it allows governors and mayors to be sometimes more reform-oriented than the city
councils or regional assemblies with which they work. At the city level, Volgograd's
Chekov, a communist, is more reform-oriented than the city council, and Ulyanovsk's
Marusin is leading the city toward more democracy and more focus on business
development. At the regional level, Guzhvin of Astrakhan, a non-communist and
pragmatist, works with a communist-dominated  regional assembly. But pragmatism does
not always work in one direction. Resource-rich Tatarstan can better afford continued
subsidies than most of the other regions, a pragmatic consideration. And so Kazan has
been only moderately progressive on price liberalization, privatization and containment
of housing subsidies.
Democratization
With few exceptions, local administrations still rely on authoritarian power and
centralization of operations-the  "old ways" of governance. Many elected officials held
important local positions under the old regime and were appointed to their positions a few
years before the elections took place. Even when new faces were elected, much of the
administration consists of former  bureaucrats who mostly continue to run things as
before. There is little positive correlation between reformist mayors and a democratic
mode of governance. Some of the most successful mayors, and governors, have been of
the Luzhkov type in the eyes of the people, as well as of foreign investors.
Democratization and the pursuit of the "right" policies are still two different matters.
One aspect of authoritarianism is media control. At one extreme, Samara,
perhaps the most democratic of the Volga cities, has experienced rapid development of its
mass media.  It has about a hundred local newspapers and a dozen local magazines, in
addition to the national papers, and three local private TV stations and six private radio
stations, in addition to national and local-government stations. At the other extreme, only
local, primarily government-owned  newspapers are read in Volgograd and Ulyanovsk,
and these cities have no local privately owned TV and radio stations. The main
newspapers in Cheboksary and Astrakhan are also local and government-owned. In
Saratov, the most popular papers are the more open and more informative national
papers, distinguishing the local population as more independent and cosmopolitan. But
Ayatskov has reportedly recently signed an "Agreement on Civic Peace and Social
Partnership" restricting freedom of speech. Official statistics and documents are difficult
to obtain in Saratov, and also in Nizhni and Volgograd. Of the former closed cities, only
Samara seems to have truly opened up.
15V. OUTCOMES
Economic and social outcomes for the period 1990-96 are no easier to measure
than initial conditions or economic reforms.  Two problems are worth mentioning up
front. The first problem is that there is no satisfactory indicator of economic growth in
the Volga capitals. Estimates of money income and GNP are available only on the
regional level, and the city index of industrial production ignores any growth in services.
The second problem is that, because of differential inflation, indicators expressed in
current rubles must be converted to more comparable values. 12 There are three deflator
options: the cost of 25 basic food items in the capital city, the cost of minimum
subsistence for the region, and the regional Consumer Price Index (CPI). The last is
given in Appendix Table 1 and the other two are given in Appendix Table 6. In what
follows, "real" economic values are calculated with the CPI, which is the most broadly
based deflator available over the longest period. The CPI currently distinguishes close to
400 goods and services. 13 In measuring the living standard of lower income groups, we
use the cost of minimum subsistence as it is broader based than the cost of 25 basic food
items.
Economic Outcomes
As was the case in 1990, no data are available at the city level on per capita
income or GNP, although such measures would be the most comprehensive measures of
economic success and living standards. We therefore look again at the average real
wage, a reasonably comprehensive measure of economic outcome earlier in the
transition.  As the market economy develops, however, households benefit increasingly
from new sources of income, including business profits, rents and returns on financial
assets. We therefore consider other possible indicators of economic outcomes, including
the available city-level data on industrial production and employment and overall
changes in wages and employment.
Real Economic Wage
Figure 2 and Table 9 show 1996 average monthly wages in 1990 rubles, what we
call the "real economic wage" in the Volga capitals. Unlike 1990, when wages were
virtually the same (Table 1), these estimates vary significantly, and they differ from the
regional wages shown in Appendix Tables 4 and 9.  Tver has the highest real economic
12  Prices  of non-traded  goods  might  be expected  to differ,  but studies  show that  prices  of traded  goods  also
differ substantially  from  region  to region,  and  only  partly  because  of transport  costs  (Gluschenko  1998  and
Berkowitz  and DeJong  1998).
13 Regional  weights  for  the CPI  are based  on local  household  budget  surveys,  but they do not differ  greatly
across  regions.  Both the list of goods  and  weights  change  annually,  allowing  for variation  in quality  and
taste, but variations  from  year  to year are modest  (see  Gluschenko  1998  for more  details).  The  main
problem  with  the CPI is that,  although  it provides  the rate  of change  starting  in mid-  1991,  no initial  price
level is provided on which to base this change.  Since most prices in 1990-91 were still fixed, and since
they were fixed at the same level in the Volga regions, we assume that initial price levels were the same
and the annual  rate  of price  change  for 1990-9  lwas the same  as that for the country  as a whole.
16wage, followed by Kazan, Samara and Volgograd. Ulyanovsk and Saratov have the
lowest wages, only 60 percent of those in Tver. Data for 1996 regional real per capita
GDP (Appendix Table 3) suggest that capital-city wages are relatively high in Tver and
relatively low in Ulyanovsk and Saratov, given the strength of the regional economy.
The wage picture at end- 1996 represents a big and significant change from the
Soviet period. Not only do wages vary among cities, disparity within cities has
increased. Data for Samara, for example, show that the decline in the industrial wage
was higher than the decline in the average wage, and substantial differences have
developed among other branches of employment. Wages in the financial sector rose to
five times the average wage, and wages in education, science, culture and health care
dropped to 60 percent of the average.
Industrial Production and Employment
A decline in the absolute level of industrial production is associated with the
shock of transition, and the index of industrial production declined in all ten Volga
capitals through 1996, the last available data (Appendix Table 11). Not one city showed
signs of recovery. As shown in Figure 4, the smallest declines were in Ulyanovsk,
Nizhni, and Kazan, in that order. All three cities tried hard to protect their industry and to
some extent succeeded during the period under review. The largest declines were in
Saratov, Tver, and Cheboksary. Most industry in Tver and Cheboksary was light industry
or  machiney/metalworking, the sectors shown by Ivanov 1  998b to be the least
competitive.  Although only 34 percent of Saratov's industry was concentrated in these
two sectors, the hard budget constraint on industry imposed by Ayatskov and his
predecessors was not balanced by any serious institutional reform. Thus, not only did
industrial wages and employment decline precipitously, little was done to promote the
regulatory framework and market services required for healthy development of new
businesses.
Although production and employment both declined during 1990-96, a fact
consistent with the expected shift of output in favor of services, 15 employment declined
less radically than production. The disparity is explained in large part by substantial
disguised unemployment, suggesting that further loss of jobs in declining industries can
be expected in the future.
Overall Changes in City Wages and Employment
Table 9 summarizes several labor market characteristics in the Volga capitals:
changes in city employment and average real wages for 1990-96; and official city
unemployment in 1996. In addition, it shows the stock of regional wage arrears at end-
1997 as a percent of the wage bill, reflecting pressures to maintain both wages and
employment. All these indicators deteriorated everywhere in Russia during 1990-96, but
14  Appendix Table 12 shows the empirical analysis of changes in industrial shares for five Volga capitals
(Ivanov 1998b).
15  See Easterly, de Melo, and Ofer (1994).
17the pattern of change suggests differences among the cities in labor market flexibility and
associated policy interventions. Some cities allowed wages to fall in order to preserve
employment, and others tried to maintain wages and let employment absorb market
pressures.
A stylized view of labor market dynamics in Russia during the 1990s is presented
in Figure 3.  It shows three types of change, represented by shifts in the relevant curves: a
decline in the demand for labor (shift of Ld9o  to Ld96);  a smaller decline in the supply of
labor due mainly to the exit of women and a discouraged-worker  response to the decline
in demand (shift of vertical Ls9O  to Ls96);  and a policy-driven counter shift in the demand
for labor, as city governments use a variety of measures to avoid unemployment (shift
from Ld96  to Ld96'). Assuming the shifts represent average movements, the equilibrium
point would move from AO  to Al,  which indicates some decline in both wages and
employment. Each Volga city is then positioned in Figure 3 according to the data
presented in Table 9.
The two extreme cases are Samara and Ulyanovsk. Samara had a relatively
moderate decline in wages but the highest recorded decline in employment. Relatively
low wage arrears corroborate the perception that employment absorbs the burden of labor
market adjustment. Ulyanovsk, on the other hand, strongly protected the level of
employment but had to allow real wages to drop quite sharply.  As we know, Ulyanovsk
then cushioned those lower wages by price controls. Unemployment was kept low, but a
relatively high level of wage arrears suggests the artificial nature of some employment.
Tver stands out as having the lowest decline in real wages, only a modest decline
in employment, low official unemployment, and low wage arrears. Kazan is not far
behind Tver, but has a somewhat larger decline in wages and perhaps a smaller decline in
employment. The high level of wage arrears in Tatarstan suggests that employment in
Kazan was maintained artificially, however. The other city managing to keep a high
level of employment was Volgograd, combining a moderate decline in wages, significant
wage arrears, and pressure on enterprises to maintain jobs.  Like Samara, Cheboksary and
Yaroslavl had large losses in employment,  but with smaller declines in wages.  In both
cases, official unemployment was relatively high and wage arrears significant.
Social Outcomes
Real Social Wage
The average monthly wage divided by the cost of the subsistence minimum is the
best available measure to show the living standard of the poor. As seen in Figure 2 and
Table 9, the ranking of cities by this measure differs from the ranking according to the
real economic wage.  In particular, Ulyanovsk, which has the lowest real economic wage,
has one of the highest real social wages.  16 And Tver, with the highest real economic
16 Although Ulyanovsk also has the lowest cost of 25 basic foods, the differential with other cities is less
than the differential for the minimum subsistence.
18wage, has only a moderately high real social wage. The difference between the two
measures is the relatively low cost of the subsistence minimum basket in some cities
compared to the regional CPI. Kazan, Nizhni, Ulyanovsk, and Yaroslavl have the highest
real social wage, and Saratov has by far the lowest, combining a situation of low
economic wages with substantial price liberalization. In fact, Saratov suffers from
declining population (low birth rate and very high death rate) and wide income disparities
with a large percent of the population receiving less than the subsistence minimum.
Yaroslavl, Nizhni and especially Ulyanovsk, have dramatically improved the purchasing
power of low income groups by keeping subsistence costs down.
Income Distribution
Increasing inequality in the distribution of income is a well-recognized
consequence of transition. It has been observed in both Central and Eastern Europe and in
the Newly Independent States of the Forner  Soviet Union. The statistics available in
1996 suggested that in Russia such inequality was already at OECD levels in the late
1980s and had increased to the (higher) level of middle income countries by 1993.17
Typically, more inequality reflects increases in unemployment and in wage dispersion;
higher income from rent and profits, which are less equally distributed than wages; and
growing regional inequalities.
Appendix Table 13 provides evidence of increasing inequality both within and
amnong  the Volga cities.  Although per capita sales of consumer goods have dropped
strongly in all cities (with available data) except Kazan, telephones and cars per 1000
residents have increased substantially. This suggests that while the purchasing power of
the average citizen is declining, the purchasing power of the top half of households is
increasing. The two most extreme examples appear to be Astrakhan, where consumer
goods sales dropped 43 percent and cars increased 60 percent, and Tver, where consumer
goods sales dropped 39 percent and cars more than doubled. For evidence on diverging
incomes between capital cities and their surrounding regions, see de Melo and Ofer 1999.
Education and Health
There are relatively few output indicators in the social sphere available on a
comparative basis at the city level. One set of indicators is provided in Appendix Table
14. It includes the level and change in the city population of school age (below the
working age of 15) together with the level and change in the number of children in 2nd
and 3rd shifts.  What is striking is that although the school age population declined
between 1990 and 1996 in all cities for which data are available, the number of students
in 2nd and 3rd shifts increased.
7  See  Figure  4.1 of World  Bank 1996.
19VI. INTERACTIONS AMONG INITIAL CONDITIONS, POLICIES AND
OUTCOMES AND OTHER OBSERVATIONS
As discussed above, there are no comprehensive indicators of growth at the city
level, and employment data have more than one interpretation. Data on most social
indicators are partial. We therefore use the real economic wage and the real social wage
as indicators of socioeconomic outcomes in the cities, despite their limitations.  They are
shown in Table 10 along with the summary indicators for initial conditions and policy
reform. Given the data available and the methods used, our observations on how they are
related should be characterized as hypotheses rather than conclusions.
Initial Conditions and Policies
With one exception, namely Astrakhan, rankings on initial conditions and policy
reform are similar for all cities. Initial conditions were particularly poor in Cheboksary
and Ulyanovsk and policy reforn has been slow in both cities. In Samara, Yaroslavl, and
Tver, initial conditions were favorable and policy reform has been relatively strong. The
apparent positive relationship between initial conditions and reform suggests that initial
conditions are important for both the speed and success of economic reforms at the
municipal level just as they are at the macro level.  It is possible, for example, that
relatively poor prospects caused local leaders in Ulyanovsk and Cheboksary to be more
cautious on reform.
Initial Conditions, Policies and Outcomes
The close correspondence between initial conditions and reform implies that it is
difficult to associate them separately with outcomes. The discussion here will therefore
relate economic and social outcomes to initial conditions and reforms together.  In doing
this, it is possible to distinguish three cases, which in turn suggest some generalizations.
Saratov epitomizes the first case, where socioeconomic outcomes are worse than one
might expect given initial conditions and policy reforms.  Yaroslavl and possibly
Volgograd fall into this camp as real economic wages are less favorable than might be
expected. Ulyanovsk epitomizes the second case, where social, if not economic,
outcomes are better than one might expect. Kazan also falls into this camp, although
Kazan's enhanced access to resources provides a fairly clear explanation for its favorable
outcomes. The third case includes the other five cities that have performed more or less
as expected.
In the first case, Yaraoslavl and Volgograd have high rankings on reform,
suggesting that there may be a time lag between reform and recovery. Also, it is likely
that in reformist regions, with a more developed private sector, wages contribute less to
total household incomes than in the conservative regions.  Thus, any positive relationship
observed between reforms and outcomes measured only by wages may be understated.
The poor performance of Saratov appears to result at least in part from weak leadership
and poor governance prior to Ayatskov and a policy favoring agriculture over industry.
18 See de Melo,  Denizer,  Gelb,  and  Tenev  (1997)  for evidence  at the macro  level.
20Kazan's success relative to its initial conditions and reform record is more easily
understood.  It has extracted large concessions from the center in terms of high tax
retention and fiscal transfers. It is rich in natural resources and has attracted foreign
investment. It has maintained relatively stable real wages and employment and good
relations with the center. Although total industrial production declined more than in
Nizhni and Ulyanovsk, it declined considerably less than elsewhere.
The second case also suggests that delaying reforms may help delay production
declines or that some "reforms" may be better than others. Ulyanovsk's efforts to protect
consumers by delaying price liberalization for basic foods and municipal services appear
to have been successful through 1996. Despite the lowest economic wage, the
Ulyanovsk's social wage was one of the highest. Given the limited time horizon of this
study, it would appear that higher living standard for low-income groups can in fact be
achieved by price controls, particularly when those controls are increasingly limited to
subsistence items and efforts are made to target or otherwise prevent over consumption.
In the third case, Samara and Tver score relatively well on socioeconomic
outcomes as well as on initial conditions and reforms. Cheboksary and Astrakhan score
poorly on most indicators, and Nizhni falls in between. This case highlights the fact that
Red Belt cities have typically lagged in reforms and have had less successful economic
outcomes.
What Matters
What follows are some observations on the hypotheses suggested above:
Resources matter. Kazan has benefited enormously from Tatarstan's unique
arrangements with the federal government. Tatarstan has a bilateral agreement with the
Federal government that includes special "single channel" tax arrangements; during
1994-96 it paid to the center an average of only 20 percent of regionally collected taxes,
whereas the Russia-wide average was 40 percent. The republic was also the biggest
recipient of federal transfers during the first 9 months of 1997 and benefited particularly
from political transfers associated with property deals, special agreements and targeted
programs.  Other regions received smaller transfers, primarily from the Fund for
Financial Support of the Regions, an equalization fund that accounts for about half of all
federal transfers.  In 1996, Saratov was one of the 10 largest recipients of FFSR transfers
(MFK Renaissance 1998a).
Other cities and regions may have been less successful in attracting transfers from
the center, but actions reflect not only the importance of resources but also the
importance of political and legal bargaining in obtaining resources.  In November 1996,
Volgograd mayor Yuri Chekhov sued the federal government for 200 billion rubles ($37
million) owed to the city for wages, pensions, and social programs.  Samara is currently
working on a deal to exchange federal debt to the region for regional shares in the
federally owned airport. Most cities are making major efforts to attract foreign
investment and payments from federal and regional authorities to help restructure the
21largest enterprises. The ability of Boris Nemtsov to arrange for federal assistance to GAZ
(the car factory) has made a significant difference to the local economy in Nizhni.
Weak  government matters. This hypothesis is not as obvious as it sounds.  At the
beginning of transition, some observers thought the market economy and hence growth
would flourish best where government was weak or absent, since the control instinct of
any post-communist government would stifle competition. The model of decentralized
decision-making by economic agents in this scenario did not require cooperation, much
less bartering and bargaining services, to produce an orderly flow of products and factors
of production. The reality appears to be different, at least in Russia.
Strong leadership at the local level seems to have paid off.  Weak leadership has
not. This may be partly because regional policies are typically more conservative and
prevail where local leadership is weak. It may also be that without strong unified
leadership at the local level, the regions win out in the competition for resources.
Uncertain alliances characterized  politics at the local level in Saratov and Ulyanovsk
prior to 1996; and, as mentioned earlier, city councils in Yaroslavl, Tver, and Nizhni are
made up of small interest groups that make governance difficult. Most of these cities (see
below on Tver) have performed less well than expected. The most obvious example of
weak government is Saratov. The governors prior to Ayatskov, elected at end-I 996,
were poor leaders, as were the mayors. The city's fiscal position is poor, with a low share
of cash revenues at the city level, low cost recovery on housing and utilities, and high
fiscal deficits.
Time lags may matter. Yaroslavl, a city with favorable initial conditions and the
highest ranking on reforrn, has only a moderate real economic wage after six years of
transition.  At the same time, the slowest reformers, namely Ulyanovsk, Cheboksary and
Astrakhan have done better than their reform record would indicate ifreform were
positively associated with favorable socioeconomic outcomes. Ulyanovsk was a region
where the oblast government tried to maintain enterprise production and employment
despite low profitability.  As a result it had one of the lowest declines in industrial
production in Russia through 1993, although quite significant declines occurred in 1994-
96.
One explanation for these anomalies is the time lag between outcomes and reform
shown at the macroeconomic level in de Melo et al (1996, 1997). If it is true, for
example, that the successful adaptation of defense industries is rare, the hard budget
constraint on Saratov's defense industries may result in large early declines in production
but release resources to promote a strong subsequent recovery. Reforms would not show
up in better economic outcomes until sometime in the future. This same logic would
imply that production declines in Ulyanovsk would continue in the future even if industry
elsewhere picks up.  It is too soon to comment definitively on such scenarios.
Red Belt matters, with some exceptions. Red Belt cities all ranked low on the
socioeconomic outcomes indicator, whereas non-Red Belt cities ranked high. This is
despite the fact that one Red Belt city, Astrakhan, appeared initially to have quite
favorable prospects while one non-Red Belt city, Nizhni, did not.  These outcomes are
22likely to be due in part to slower reform in the Red Belt on average. Three of the Red
Belt cities-Ulyanovsk,  Cheboksary, and Astrakhan-have  clearly lagged on reforms.
But there is diversity within the Red Belt group. Volgograd was an early reformer, and
Saratov has more recently stepped up its reform efforts. Historically, Saratov was a
cosmopolitan city and in the late 19th century benefited from substantial foreign
investmnent  in industry. Taking into account its favorable natural resources, deserting the
Red Belt should not be surprising.
Some non-Red Belt cities may have been slower on reforms than expected. Kazan
falls into this category. High income and access to resources allow Tartarstan to pursue a
course of multiple objectives, permitting it to become an honorary member of the Red
Belt, undertaking  "development with a human face". Slightly surprising is the absence
of Nizhni from the very top rank on policy reform, as political leaders there projected a
strong reformist image during the early days of transition.
Other points:
Growth  poles.  It may be that Moscow's proximity is an advantage to Tver,
providing Tver positive spillover effects from Moscow's size and growth to firms in Tver
that now benefit from economies of scale not otherwise possible given its relatively small
population. Proximity also creates externalities arising from the impetus for innovation
and spread of knowledge, assuming their benefits outweigh any congestion costs.
Moreover, four adjacent regions in the middle Volga-Tatarstan,  Samara, Saratov, and
Volgograd-appear  to have formed their own growth pole.  They are supporting pro-
reform politicians and attracting foreign investment. Part of Samara region's success may
be the high urbanization rate and the unusual conglomeration of two large, neighboring
cities-Samara  and Togliatti. Saratov is an unlikely setting for a reform candidate, as it
has traditionally been a closed city and formed part of the Red Belt.  But in November
1977, Governor Ayatskov pushed through a path-breaking bill that explicitly allows the
purchase and sale of land within the region by any Russian citizen (MFK Renaissance
1998c). It is tempting to speculate that Saratov has been influenced by the proximity of
reformist Samara.
Growth poles can, of course, have negative, as well as positive, effects, especially
in the short run.  For example, Samara appears to have lost out to Togliatti in the
competition for regional leadership, with the result that local and foreign resources have
been channeled more to Togliatti and Samara has performed less well than might be
expected. Togliatti, a city of more that 700,00 people, has a youthful population and
experienced a 6 percent plus increase in industrial production in 1996. At this time, the
average monthly wage in Togliatti was 50 percent higher than for the region while the
wage in Samara was 10 percent below the region's wage.19
Natural resources. The energy sector did attract foreign investment in Kazan and
Samara, and to a lesser extent in Saratov and Volgograd. But as of end-1996 it was not a
determining factor in overall foreign investment, much less general economic
19 Statistics on Togliatti from "Togliatti  in Business," city web page II  www.tlt.ru on 11/30/98.
23performance. With the exception of Tver, the cities in strong agricultural regions appear
to have suffered, possibly from agriculture's competition for scarce resources.
Defense industry. We initially took a neutral position regarding the influence of
defense industry on outcomes. Further analysis does not shed much light on this
question. Leaving aside Kazan, because of its better overall access to resources, the
experiences of Nizhni, Samara and Saratov suggest that these cities have not necessarily
benefited from previous high levels of defense industry. On the other hand, they may not
have suffered either, since the large size of these cities results in a relatively high level of
industrial diversity despite the concentration of defense industry. 20
City size. With the exception of Tver, economic outcomes appear to be more
favorable in the larger cities than in the smaller ones. Like Tver, Yaroslavl has been an
active reformer, but results are disappointing. The other three smaller cities-Ulyanovsk,
Cheboksary, and Astrakhan-have  the lowest real economic wage.  If small size is a
disadvantage, it could be another reason why these cities have been more cautious on
reforns.  One explanation for less success would be that, compared to larger cities,
smaller cities do not have as much political influence, and hence claim on resources, at
either the regional or federal level. Another explanation would be the lower industrial
diversity found in small cities, the same point made for cities with a high level of defense
industry.
Closed cities. Of the four formerly closed cities (Nizhni, Samara, Saratov and
Volgograd), only Samara has a reputation for having an active free press and freely
available information.
Developments in 1997 and 1998
The time between the end of 1996 and mid-1998 was a period of "virtual
stability" and of hopes for resumed growth in Russia. These hopes ended with the August
crisis, but there were earlier warnings. During the period before the crisis, FDI increased,
but financial capital flows dominated; high interest rates, especially during the second
half of the period, discouraged real investment. Barter transactions and the use of other
money surrogates increased and arrears proliferated. The following perspective on
developments in 1997 and 1998 is based on partial data at both the city and regional
levels.
Production. A number of cities experienced for the first time a small increase in
industrial production in 1997 (Saratov, Cheboxary, some industries in Yaroslavl). This
increase was combined with some decline in unemployment, explained in part by a
continued decline in the labor force (Saratov, Yaroslavl). 2'  However, a decline in profits
20 Glaeser  et al. (1992)  provides  evidence  for the importance  of industrial  diversity  based  on the study  of
U.S. cities. Industrial  diversity  promotes  growth,  as knowledge  spills  over  industry  groups  and  stimulates
new ideas  and innovations.  In other  words,  competition  and  inter-industry,  rather  than  intra-industry,
knowledge  spillovers  are important  for  growth.
21 Interestingly,  the 1997  data  on registered  unemployment  show  that  the only  two  regions  experiencing  an
24during recent years was reported by larger enterprises in Yaroslavl, especially in
manufacturing and trade. And, in a late-1998 survey of 60 small textile enterprises in six
Volga cities, more firms reported losing money than reported making profits (de Melo,
Ofer and Yossifov 1999). They also reported a decline over the previous year in labor
productivity and employment.
FDI. In 1997 FDI to Russia increased over 1996, but among the Volga regions
FDI rose only for Samara (from $9 to $18 per capita), which ranked fourth among all
Russian regions in FDI. It declined for Tatarstan, Nizhni and Saratov, and these regions
plus Volgograd all ranked below Samara. Nizhni almost vanished from the list. In an
evaluation of the investment risk in a number of regions Samara came in fifth place,
Nizni sixth, Tatarstan eleventh and Saratov twenty-first (Carana Company 1998).
Prices.  Goskomstat data for 1997 show that the disparity in the cost of 25 food
items has narrowed among the Volga capitals, although the cost is still lowest in
Ulyanovsk, Cheboksary and Kazan. The disparity in the cost of minimum subsistence
has also narrowed.  Saratov was the only city where neither of these costs increased in
current rubles, so its relative position on the real social wage has improved. We know,
however, that price controls still exist. An October 1998 survey of 60 textile and clothing
firms in six of the Volga capitals found that two-fifths of the firms were subject to price
22 controls.  Firms in Astrakhan and Samara had the most complaints. Most controls were
product-specific, but some firms reported controls on retail margins.
Incomes and wages. Disparity in real incomes clearly increased among the Volga
regions, and presumably the capitals, in 1997, with Sarnara showing a growth of 73
percent in real per capita income and Chuvashia only 19 percent over an 18-month  period
(Appendix Table 4).23  Tver had a low-income growth as well as the lowest growth in
real economic wage along with Ulyanovsk, suggesting that weak government may be
dominating the Moscow growth pole effect. The picture on wages is different.  The
largest increases in the regional real economic wage in 1997 were in Chuvashia,
Astrakhan, and Saratov. Saratov also appears to have experienced some increase in the
real wage in and in regional per capita income during 1998, but this was before the crisis.
As these regions contained three of the five capital cities with the lowest real economic
wage in 1996, wage disparity appears to have moderated. The real economic wage was
still quite low in Ulyanovsk and Yaroslavl in 1997, and real wages declined in Yaroslavl
in 1998.
Fiscal. The years 1997 and 1998 were the first two in which elected mayors and
city councils were everywhere in place and fiscal relationships with the upper level
government were put in better formal order.  In particular, the tax shares and transfers
increase in registered unemployment are Samara and Tatarstan, the most successful otherwise (Appendix
Table 10).
22 See de Melo, Ofer, and Yossifov (1999) for further details on this survey.
23 Note that December  1997  wage  and income  data  in Appendix  Table  4 will  be biased  to the extent  that end-of-year
bonuses  are significant  and vary  among  the regions.
25accruing to cities were more predictable. All cities for which 1996-98 budgetary
information are available managed to increase their share of "own taxes" and thus to
offset declines in shared taxes and transfers from upper level governments. Of the three
cities for which more complete budgets are available (Nizhni, Saratov and Yaroslavl), the
situation in Saratov appeared the worse, with a consistent deficit, of 8, 10 and 5 percent
during '96, '97, and '98, respectively. In 1998 budget expenditures in Saratov dropped to
63 percent of the 1996 level and only 43 percent of revenues were in cash.
Reforms. Reforms at the city level seem to have slowed in some critical areas.
Small-scale privatization of enterprises was more or less completed, and the number of
newly established private enterprises, and small enterprises more generally, declined in
some cities. In Saratov there was still a marginal increase in the number of small
enterprises in 1997, but the increment was less than in previous years, and the number of
joint stock companies actually declined. The reform of the housing sector-including
privatization and cost sharing by households-seems  to have slowed down. In the 1998
city budgets for Yaroslavl, Nizhni-Novgorod and Saratov, expenditures on housing and
utilities were between a third plus to 40 percent of total expenditures and growing over
time. Only one region among the ten covered here, Samara, achieved housing cost-
sharing of more than 50 percent by 1998, and three more regions-Tver,  Chuvashia and
Volgograd-achieved  shares above 35 percent. Cost sharing in Saratov and Ulyanovsk
remained below 18 percent, which is considered very low. Arrears of household
payments for housing and utilities averaged about 20 percent of charges, with a much
higher figure in Tatarstan (35 percent) and a much lower figure in Samara and
Volgograd.2 4
Social. On the bright side, two cities, Saratov and Yaroslavl reported a significant
decline in the number of crimes since 1996. However, the lack of economic growth has
been aggravated by increasing income inequality even since 1996. In Yaroslavl, real
wages are estimated to have declined by 25 percent in the first nine months of 1998 as
compared to the first nine months of 1997. Income inequality declined very slightly over
the same period but the decile ratio was still over 10 and the Gini coefficient .36
(Yaroslavl City 1998). Measures of income inequality for city of Saratov are not
available, but regional data show an increase from 1997 to 1998, with the decile ratio
rising from 7 to 10 and the Gini coefficient from .31 to .35.
Concluding Remarks
Several more general observations on Russian transition emerge from this paper.
First, all cities have experienced radical changes in their institutions and their
economies-changes  associated on the one hand with the abolition of central planning
and the introduction of freer markets and on the other hand with political decentralization
and the introduction of local elections. Second, these changes have led to a wide
diversity in economic and social outcomes. To some extent this diversity reflects
24 The information  on housing  is based on Institute  for the Urban  Economy  1998  and  miscellaneous
materials  provided  by the Institute.
26differences in the central government's economic relations with regions, and especially
with Tatarstan, arising from its lack of resolve and ability to treat them equitably. And to
some extent it is the outcome of differing policies at the regional and local levels. As we
have seen, most northern cities adopted policies more consistent with the central
government's support of free market reforms, and most southern, Red Belt cities pursued
more cautious and protective policies.
Third, in almost all cases we observe an increasing use of more pro-active
economic policies by city governments. The pros and cons of protecting industry may
have been debated at the federal level, but at the local level city governments do not
hesitate to fight for the survival of their local industries on all fronts. Such differences in
central and local govermment  approaches seem to occur elsewhere, even in market
economies; so it is perhaps not surprising. Nevertheless, pro-active interventions at the
local level are of particular significance given the nature of Russian transition, where
decentralization is as much from central government to local government as it is from
public to private enterprises. A notable exception in recent years is Saratov, where
Ayatskov has supported a hard budget constraint for industry.
Fourth, the jury is still out on the question of what were the right social and
industrial policies during the first years of the reform. The possible time lag between
policies and outcomes makes it difficult to judge, but one cannot avoid doubting the
conventional wisdom that a more "humanistic" and interventionist economic approach
was misguided.  Is it possible that the partial shield provided by many local governments
against radical changes has helped Russia weather an extremely difficult period?  Samara
appears to be setting a relatively good example with some institutional support for market
reforms. But Ulyanovsk and Saratov represent two extremes on the policy front.
Whereas Ulyanovsk has clearly lagged on market reforms, Saratov appears to represent a
model of liberalization without institutional support. Both extremes have failed, but so far
the social consequences of the Saratov model appear to be worse than those of the
Ulyanovsk model.
And finally, with the credibility of the federal govermnent in Russia at an all time
low, foreign investors have no choice but to rely on the competence and reliability of
local leaders, especially mayors and governors. They will be looking for evidence of
accountability in the form of the rule of law and transparency in the form of reliable
public information. Yet, information at the city level is often not available and not easily
accessible. This study tries to demonstrate  the potential usefulness of good information.
In developed countries, such publicly available stacistics would cover municipal
employment; planned and actual city budgets and any extra-budgetary funds; municipal
services such as public transport, police protection, garbage collection, and fire trucks;
social statistics on education, health, and crime; air and water pollution levels;
organization and composition of city courts; business statistics on firm ownership,
activities, and employees; tourism; and public construction. Good information will
attract local researchers to help monitor progress, as a basis for accountability, and to
help diagnose problems, as a basis for public policy debate and political decisions.
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Tver  460  275  153  17.7  31  <10  + (L)  253  192 (A)
Yaroslavl  635  271  149  14.8  44  10-15  + (L)  264  205
NizhniNovgorod  1421  271  151  14.9  44  25-35  +(L)  259  201
Cheboksaryc/  429  264  133  13.0  50  <10  ...  243  165 (A)
Kazan c/  1103  266  169  18.4  47  25-35  + (NR)  266  187
Ulyanovsk  637  270  145  20.0  46  10-15  ...  260  189
Samara  1260  264  140  23.3  43  25-35  + (L)  265  200
Saratov  907  275  145  20.3  41  15-25  + (NR)  255  197 (A)
Volgograd  1003  271  140  15.2  41  <10  ...  273  198
Astrakhan  482  265  142  18.1  34  <10  ...  251  196 (A)
Memo item
Russian Federation  148543  - 158  17.4  30  <10  ...  297  215
Source: Goskomstat, Cities of Russian Federation, 1995, Goskomstat, Regionyi Rossii, Vol.1 and Vol.2, 1997, city case studies and city
statistical bulletins.
a/  Classification based on 1985 data in Gaddy (1996) and author's estimates.
b/ (A) indicates regions with a relatively strong agricultural base.
c/  Cheboksary is the capital of the Chuvash Republic, also know as Chuvashia, and Kazan is the capital of Tatarstan Republic. All other
regions are oblasts with the same name as the capital city, e.g. Tver is the capital of Tver Oblast.Table 2: Shares of Industrial Sectors by Volume of Sales, 1989
(percent)
Industrial  Sectors of  Yaroslavl  Nizhni  Cheboksary  Kazan  Ulyanovsk  Samara  Saratov  Volgograd  Astrakhan
Capital  Cities  Novgorod
Chemicalandpetrochemical  47.7  4.3  0.0  31.6  0.1  15.4  26.9  26.2  6.0
Metallurgy  0.3  2.4  3.6  0.3  0.0  4.9  0.4  25.8  0.0
Machinery and metal-working  25.8  57.7  48.2  20.2  60.5  39.5  27.9  26.4  15.2
Forest products  1.9  2.3  0.9  1.6  3.8  2.3  5.0  3.6  9.7
Construction materials  2.3  2.3  2.0  3.8  7.7  4.4  7.3  4.5  6.8
Light industry  10.4  11.0  32.6  24.2  6.5  5.3  8.0  2.6  28.1
Food industry  9.7  18.6  12.6  13.0  17.4  27.3  23.3  9.8  32.7
Other  2.1  1.4  0.0  5.3  4.1  0.8  1.2  1.2  1.6
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100
Source: Industrial  Census  1989 as cited in Ivanov  1998b.Table  3: Expectations  of  Success in Volga  Cities Based on Initial  Conditions
Low Share of  Low Share of  Favorable
Capital Cities  Industrial  Industry in Two  Less Industrial  Location or  Total
Employment in  Least Competitive  Specialization a!  Natural
Total a/  Sectors a/  Resources
Tver  2  0b/  1  b/  1  4
Yaroslavl  1  2  0  1  4
Nizhni  Novgorod  1  0  0  1  2
Cheboksary  0  0  0  - 0
Kazan  0  1  1  1  3
Ulyanovsk  0  0  0  - 0
Samara  1  1  1  1  4
Saratov  1  2  1  1  5
Volgograd  1  2  1  - 4
Astrakhan  2  1  1  - 4
Source:  Tables 1 and 2.
i  Low: 2; medium: 1; high: 0. See text for ranges.
- Tver is not included in Table 2. These estimates are based on partial information on industrial
production in Goskomstat 1994 and Yakovlev 1998.Table 4: Price Controls on Goods and Serviees in 1995-1996
Capital Cities  and Services  Severity  Berkowitz\Baranchuk b/
Tver  5-10  Below Average  1.1
Yaroslavl  5-10  Above Average  1.7
Nizhni Novgorod  10-17  Medium  1.6
Cheboksary  18-25+  Above Average  2.2
Kazan  10-17  Above Average  2.1
Ulyanovsk  10-17  High  4.4
Samara  5-10  Low  0.9
Saratov  5-10  Low  1.0
Volgograd  10-17  High  2.6
Astarkhan  18-25  Above Average  2.3
Memo item
Russia  18.1 a/  N/A  N/A
Source: Baranchuk 1998.
a/ The average percent for Russia is 18.  1, 17.8 for all foods, 8.9 for non-food goods and 38.4
for services.
- The higher the rank, the stricter the controlsTable 5: Fiscal Policy Indicators of Volga Cities, 1996
(percent)
Housing
Cities  Tax Effort a/  Subsidy
Burden b/
Tver  4.4  5.1
Yaroslavl  3.9  4.7
Nizhni Novgorod  5.5  5.5
Cheboksary  5.0  4.5
Kazan  7.1  5.5
Ulyanovsk  5.0  4.3
Samara  6.6  5.7
Saratov  8.3  7.3
Volgograd  5.0  4.8
Astrakhan  2.5  5.5
Source: Ministry of Finance of the Russian
Federation for budget data and Table 9 for wage data.
a/Per capita Property Tax and Other Tax revenues in CRJs as percent of the capital
city annual wage in 1996.
b/ Per capita Housing Subsidy in CRJs as percent of the capital city annual wage in
1996.Table 6: Housing Privatization, Small BusinessgDevelopment  and
Foreign Investment in Volga Cities
Privatization of  Small Enterprises  Flow of Total
Capital Cities  Housing as Percent  in Region per  Foreign Investment,
of the Entire  Thousand  (USD per Capita),
Eligible Stock, 1996  Residents, 1996  1995 and 1996
Tver  34  2.7  184
Yaroslavl  25  5.5  51
Nizhni Novgorod  33  3.8  41 a/
Cheboksary  20 b/  3.1  N/A
Kazan  12  4.2  46
Ulyanovsk  12  3.3  1
Samara  27  5.8  30
Saratov  28  3.6  N/A
Volgograd  39  4.9  16
Astrakhan  32  4.4  2
Source: Goskomstat, Regionyi Rossii, Vol. 2, 1997, city case studies, city statistical
bulletins and authors' calculations.
a'  1996 data only
b/  1995 dataTable 7: Policy Reforms in Volga Cities as of 1996
Capital  Cities  e  Tax  Housing  Housing  Small  Business  Foreign  Toa  Rak!
Capial  Oies  iberAlization  Effort  Subsidy  Privatization  Developmient Investment  Toa-aka
Containnment
Tver  2  1  1  2  0  2  8  4
Yaroslavl  2  1  2  1  2  2  10  5
Nizlhi Novgorod  2  1  1  2  1  2  9  4
Cheboksaiy  1  1  2  1  0  0 b/  5  2
Kazan  1  2  1  0  1  2  7  3
Ulyanovsk  0  1  2  0  0  0  3  1
Samara  2  2  1  1  2  2  10  5
Saratov  2  2  0  1  1  1  b/  7  3
Volgograd  1  1  2  2  2  1  9  4
Astmikhan  1  0  1  2  1  0  5  2
Source:  Tables 4, 5 and 6
High: 2; Medium: 1; Low: 0
a/ Total points are translated into ranks by dividing by 2 and rounding to the lower number.
b/ Assumption based on regional data.Table 8: Governors and Mayors: Volga Regions-  and Capital  Cities
Region  / City / Office  Years  Name  Comment
Tver
Governor  1995-  VladimiT Platov  former  mayor of a town, well connected with big businesses
199  1-1995  Vladimir  Suslov  Appointed  by Yeltsin
Mayor  1996  Alexander  Belousov  K  Reformist  leader,  good administrator,  popular,  initiates FI
Yaroslavl
Reformer, appointed'  92, elected'  95 over a communist  candidate.
Governor  1992-  AaoyLsisRussia  Choice Party,  good administrator
Mayor  1995-  IV.  Volonchunas  Political  ally of governor
Nizhni Novgorod
Govemor  1996-  Ivan Skylarov  Reformer  but models  himself  after Luzhkov,  not Nemtsov
1991-1996  Boris Nemtsov  Early liberal  retormer,  became  minister  and Deputy Prime Minister
Mayor  1995-1996  Ivan Skylarov  Reformer
1992-1994  DDmitri  Bednyakov  Reformer,  appointed  by Nemtsov
Chuvash/Cheboksary
President  1996.  Ni  .oli  F  vReformer,  previously  Law Minister  of Russia,  good Moscow  and
President  1996-  Nikolai  Fyoderov  1itrainlcnat international contacts
Mayor  1996-  Anatoly  Igumnov  Progressive,  first elected oillowing  a series of short appointments
Tatarstan/Kazan
President  1996-  Minitmer  Shaiinev  1ReForm-onented,  but in a "human"  way, good international  contacts
Mayor  1996-  Isakhov  Ally of Shaimiev,  good administrator
Samara
Govemor  Electe 1996KoReformer,  Our  Home  is Russia  Party, good  influence in Moscow,
Governor  Elected  1996  Konstantim  Titov  prfssoa  adinsrao professional  administrator
1997-  Gregory Laminski  Elected  with support  ot  Yabloko and Lebed against a communist
Mayor  T991  -1997  Oleg Sysuyev  appointed,  then twice elected  in '94 and '96. Excellent  international
Ulyanovsk
GovemorT1991-el96)  YuriGoryaConservative  from Our Home is Russia  Party, won election against  a
Governor  1991-  (eL.'96) Yuri Goiyachev  communist
Mayor  T996T-~f  Vitalii Marusin  Run and won against Ermakov,  considered more independent
aYr  192- 1996  Sergey  Ermakov  Dependent  on region  and (ioryachev
Saratov
Reform-oriented,  with hands-on  policies, gives priority  to agriculture,
1996-  Dmitri Ayatskhov  supported by Yeltsin
Govemor  1994- 1996  A.N. Malikov  Appointed by Yeltsin, former communist,  conservative and not very
Governor  1994-1996  A.N. Malikov  effective
1992-1994  Yuri Belyh  Appointed by Yeltsin, former communist,  conservative and not very
1992-1994  luiBlheffective
Mayor  1996-  Yuri Akseyenko  FElected  after a series of appointed mayors (Kitov, Malikov)
Volgograd
Goveor  1996-  lNikolai  Maksyuta  Conservative,  defeated Shabunin,  governs a communist Duma
G  199 -196  Ivan Shabunin  Still  influential  even after defeat,  authoritative,  strong administration
Mayor  995-  Yu  Chekov  Moderate  city council  communist,  reform-oriented
Astrakhan
Govemor  1991- (el.'96)  Anatoly Guzhvin  Pragmatist, Our Home is Russia Party. Ifuential  in broader VoIga region
Mayor 1995. AleanroiAppointed'95, elected'  96, Our Home is Russia Party, efficient and Mayor  1995-  Alexandrovidh  Bezrukavmikov  atoiaie
Suc:CycsstIes  and news  soauthoritative.
Source:  City  case  studies  and  news  sources.Table 9: Capital Cities Real Economic and Social Wages, Employment
and Unemployment  plus Regional Wage Arrears
(percent changes over 1990-96 or 1996 levels)
Real Economic  Real Social Wage  Percent Change  Percent  Official  Regional
Capital Cities  Wage  (ratio to subsistence  in Real  Change in  Unemployment  Wage
(1990 Rubles)  minimum)  Economic Wage  Employment  Rate  Arrears a/
Tver  241  2.3  -12  -15  2.3  25
Yaroslavl  180  2.5  -34  -21  6.9  32
Nizhni Novgorod  180  2.6  -34  -16  N/A  22
Cheboksary  .168  2.0  -36  -20  6.2  37
Kazan  207  2.6  -22  -12  N/A  50
Ulyanovsk  145  2.5  -46  -7  3.2  39
Samara  201  2.4  -24  -23  N/A  12
Saratov  152 b/  1.4 b/  -45 b/  -14 c/  N/A  36
Volgograd  193 d/  2.3 d/  -29 d/  -9 c/  2.0  35
Astrakhan  171  1.9  -36  -14  3.2  12
Source: Goskomstat, Cities of Russian Federation, 1995, Goskomstat, Regionyi Rossii, Vol. 1 and
Vol.2, 1997, Figure 15a from MFK Renaissance 1998b, city case studies and city statistical bulletins.
a Wage arrears as percent of the monthly wage bill. The stock of wage arrears is as at the end of
1997, wage data is for November, 1997.
/Nominal  wage in Saratov City assumed to be the same as the regional wage, as was the case in
1985-1993.
cl  Changes in city employment in Saratov and Volgograd are assumed to equal regional ones.
/Nominal  wage in Volgograd City assumed to be 15% above the regional wage, as was the case in
1995.Table 10: Comparison of Initial Conditions and Policy Reform Ratings
with Socioeconomic Outcome in Regional Capitals
Socioeconomic Outcome, 1996
Capital Cities  Conditions  Reform  Real Economic  Real Social
Wage a/  Wage b/
Tver  4  4  2  2
Yaroslavl  4  5  1  2
Nizhni Novgorod  2  4  1  2
Cheboksary  0  2  1  1
Kazan  3  3  2  2
Ulyanovsk  0  1  0  2
Samara  4  5  2  2
Saratov  5  3  0  0
Volgograd  4  4  1  2
Astrakhan  4  2  1  1
Source:  Tables  3, 7 and 9.
a/  Real economic wage is the ratio of the monthly nominal wage and the regional consumer
price index with base in 1990.
b/ Real social wage is the ratio of the monthly nominal wage and the cost of the subsistence
minimum.Appendix Table 1: Cumulative Growth of Regional Consumer Price Indexes (1990=100)
Regions  91/90 a/  92/90  b/ 1 93/90  b/  94/90 b/  95/90  bl  96/90 c/  97/90 c/
Tver  1.89  21  190  807  2375  2854  3248
Yaroslavl  1.89  23  257  1227  3664  4588  5129
Nizhni Novgorod  1.89  27  265  1097  3034  4029  4396
Chuvashia  1.89  22  219  904  2706  3388  3781
Tatarstan  1.89  22  219  872  2536  3140  3689
Ulyanovsk  1.89  24  265  1010  2972  3819  4698
Samara  1.89  27  287  1151  3387  4145  4664
Saratov  1.89  24  221  874  2469  3202  3692
Volgograd  1.89  26  261  1063  3148  3809  4320
Astrakhan  1.89  23  237  969  3175  3934  4500
Memo Item
Russian Federation  1.89  27  258  1276  3849  5804  6443
Moscow City  1.89  23  224  1010  3013  3615  4078
Source: Goskomstat, Regionyi Rossii, Vol. 2, 1997, Goskomstat,  Sotzialnoe Polozhenie i Uroven
Zhizni Naselenia Rossii, 1997, PlanEcon  Report,  No. 8-9 and No. 23-24, 1994, Goskomstat,
Tzenyi v Rossii, 1998 and authors estimates.
a/  Regional CPIs in 1991 are approximated by the annual average CPI for the Russian Federation.
b/ Regional CPIs in 1992-1995 are annual averages estimated from monthly data.
£/  Regional CPIs in 1996 and 1997 are December to December values.Appendix Table 2: Population of Cities Under Regional Jurisdiction
(thousands, end of year)
Regions  1990  1991 a/  1992 a/  1993 a/  1994 a/  1995  1996b/ |1997  c/
Tver  927  926  925  924  922  921  922  922
Yaroslavl  1053  1050  1048  1045  1043  1040  1038  1036
Nizhni Novgorod  2291  2300  2309  2318  2327  2336  2333  2330
Chuvashia  716  720  724  728  732  736  736  737
Tatarstan  2408  2417  2425  2433  2442  2450  2452  2454
Ulyanovsk  819  827  836  846  855  864  864  864
Samara  2555  2553  2552  2551  2549  2548  2546  2545
Saratov  1761  1761  1762  1762  1762  1762  1751  1740
Volgograd  1593  1597  1601  1605  1609  1613  1614  1615
Astrakhan  563  565  567  569  572  574  575  576
Source: Goskomstat "Chislenost Naselenia Rossiiskoi Federatziipo Gorodam, Poselkam
Gorodskogo Tipa i Rayonam na I Ianvaria 1997g. ", Moskva 1997, Goskomstat "Chislenost
Naselenia Rossiiskoi Federatziipo  Gorodam, Poselkam Gorodskogo Tipa i Rayonam na 1
Ianvaria 1996 g. ", Moskva 1996, Goskomstat "Chislenost Naselenia Rossiiskoi Federatzii po
Gorodam, Poselkam Gorodskogo Tipa i Rayonam na 1 lanvaria 1991 g.", Moskva 1991.
a/Data for 1991-1994 interpolated assuming constant annual growth rate of population between
1990-1995.
bl Data forI 996 interpolated assuming constant annual growth rate of population between 1995-
1997.
c/ Beginning  of the period value.
Definition of CRJs used:
1. Astrakhan Oblast, Chuvashia Republic, Tatarstan Republic, Volgograd Oblast, Yaroslavl
Oblast: Cities above 30 thousand
2. Saratov Oblast, Tver Oblast: Cities above 20 thousand
3. Nizhegorod Oblast: Cities above 50 thousand plus the three largest cities (out of four) with
population between 30 and 49.9 thousand (excluded - Gorodetz)
4. Samara Oblast: Cities above 30 thousand plus the largest city (out of two) with population
between 20 and 29.9 thousand (excluded - Neftegorsk)
5. Ulyanovsk Oblast: Cities above 30 thousand plus the largest city (out of two) with population
between 20 and 29.9 thousand (excluded - Bar'ish)Appendix Table 3: Regional Demographic and Economic Data
Real Per Capita GDP
Regions  Population ('000)  (1990 Rubles)
1990  1996  1997  1994  1995  1996
Tver  1676  1644  1633  3582  2963  3039
Yaroslavl  1476  1443  1435  3539  2777  2699
Nizhni Novgorod  3775  3711  3697  3652  3110  3162
Chuvashia  1346  1360  1359  2444  2041  2235
Tatarstan  3679  3767  3774  3708  3967  5186
Ulyanovsk  1430  1491  1483  3056  2407  2596
Samara  3250  3310  3309  4445  4015  4453
Saratov  2708  2728  2723  3328  3020  3610
Volgograd  2632  2703  2701  3000  2306  2737
Astrakhan  1007  1030  1029  2171  1759  1902
Memo Item
Russian Federation  148543  147502  147105  3228  2862  2570
Moscow City  9003  8639  8629  6143  5531  7402
Source: Goskomstat, Regionyi Rossii, Vol. 1 and Vol. 2, 1997, Goskomstat, Rossiiskii
Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik, 1997 and Goskomstat, 1998.Appendix  Table 4: Real Wages,  Real Average  Monthly  Income  and Ratios  of Nominal  Monthly  Income
and Wages to Cost of Subsistence  Minimum  for Volga Regions,  1996 and  1997
Real Monthly Wage  Average Monthly Wage to  Real Per Capita Monthly  Average Monthly Income to
Regions  (1990 Rubles)  Subsistence Minimum  Income (1990 Rubles)  Subsistence Minimum
1996  1997 a/  1996  1997 a/  1996  1997 b/  1996  1997 b/
Tver  198  257  1.9  2.6  171  210  1.7  2.1
Yaroslavl  141  184  2.0  2.7  136  202  1.9  3.0
Nizhni Novgorod  160  215  2.3  3.0  130  218  1.9  3.1
Chuvashia  130  200  1.6  2.4  117  138  1.4  1.7
Tatarstan  230  300  2.9  3.7  176  257  2.2  3.2
Ulyanovsk  137  177  2.4  3.1  126  182  2.2  3.2
Samara  220  286  2.6  3.7  167  288  2.0  3.7
Saratov  152  227  1.4  2.4  141  206  1.3  2.2
Volgograd  168  231  2.0  2.9  125  198  1.5  2.4
Astrakhan  151  228  1.7  2.8  117  183  1.3  2.2
Memo Item
Russian Federation  136  186  2.1  2.9  132  186  2.1  2.9
Source:  Goskomstat,  Regionyi Rossii,  Vol. 1 and Vol. 2, 1997, Goskomstat,  Sotzialno-Ekonomicheskoe  Polozhenie  Rossii,  January,
1998.
H: High; M: Medium;  L: Low
a/  December,  1997 data. The percentage  change over annual data for 1996 is estimated  to be the same as for nominal  wages plus  social
transfers,  since data for nominal wages alone  are no longer available.
b/ December,  1997 data.Appendix  Table  5: Prices  and Tariffs on Basic Services  Provided  by Eight  Cities,  1996
(Current  Rubles,  as of 12/31/96)
1Nizhni
Services  / Cities  Tver  Yaroslavl  Novgord  Cheboksary  Kazan  Ulyanovsk  Samara  Saratov
City Public Bus (I Trip)  700  500  1200 *  700  900  500  1000  800
Municipal  Housing  (Rubles/Sq.  Meter)  471  260  543  77  990  25  754 *  45
Telephone  (Monthly)  18000  *  N/A  18000  *  N/A  N/A  12500  14000  14000
Electricity  (per 100  Kilowatt/Hour)  6000  12000  12000  14000 *  12000  7200  12500  9000
Water Supply  and Sewerage  (Monthly  per Person)  1375  N/A  3496  N/A  N/A  1740  5175 *  2934
Hot Water  Supply  (Monthly  per Person)  3741  N/A  5064  N/A  N/A  1800  7530 *  3185
Natural Gas (Monthly  per Person)  1200  855  1350  900  1000  1500 *  640  891
Central  Heating  (Monthly  per Person  per Sq. Meter)  343  662 *  480  480  300  150  351  305
Primary Health  Care (per  Doctor's Visit)  30000 *  N/A  19865  20500  19704  8367  5660  1800
Source: City case  studies and city statistical  bulletins.
*Highest  price  for this service.Appendix Table 6: Cost a Set of 25 Food Items and the Subsistence Minimum
(thousand current rubles)
Cost of a Set of 25 Basic Food Items  in Capital  Monthly Minimum  Subsistence,
Capital  Cities  City,  End  of Year  a/  Region  bJ
1992  e/  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1994  1995  1996  1997  d/
Tver  4  21  82  174  186  203  77  222  294  327
Yaroslavl  4  23  85  176  201  219  98  255  329  349
Nizhni  Novgorod  4  23  94  184  201  206  76  216  282  312
Cheboksary  3  19  70  156  179  184  68  197  279  316
Kazan  3  19  70  149  166  188  60  192  251  300
Ulyanovsk  2  13  51  127  147  183  51  154  217  264
Sarnara  4  30  91  213  216  226  79  257  351  359
Saratov  4  23  89  187  205  205  84  242  350  349
Volgograd  4  23  85  182  196  214  79  237  322  350
Astrakhan  3  24  76  176  200  226  77  244  347  367
Memo  Item
Russian  Federation  N/A  26  91  198  220  233  87  264  369  415
Source: Goskomstat, Regionyi Rossii, Vol.2, 1997, Goskomstat, Tzenyi v Rossii, 1998 and
Goskomstat, Sotzialno-Ekonomicheskoe  Polozhenie Rossii, January, 1998.
The set of 25 food items includes foods from 11 aggregate groups: bread products, potatoes,
vegetables, fruits, meat products, fish products, eggs, milk products, sugar and candies, oil and
margarin, salt and pepper.
b  Annual average data. The subsistence minimum includes expenditures on minimum quantities of
certain food items, expenditures on non-food goods and services and payments of taxes and other
required payments. The shares of the above mentioned expenditures in the subsistence minimum
are determined by their corresponding shares in the expenditures of the households in the lowest
10% of the income distribution (see Goskomstat, Sotzialnaia Sfera Rossii, 1996, p.48).
cl  Cost of a set of 19 food items.
d' December, 1997 data.Appendix Table 7: Enterprises and Small Enterprises per Thousand Residents of Regions
Total  Number  of Enterprises  and Organizations  per Thousand  Number  of Small  Enterprises  per
Regions  Residents  Thousand  Residents
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1994  1995  1996  1997al
Tver  2.9  2.9  3.4  5.8  12.1  13.5  14.5  15.8  3.8  3.6  2.7  2.3
Yaroslavl  2.1  2.2  3.5  7.9  12.3  13.5  14.4  15.5  6.0  5.7  5.5  5.7
NizhniNovgorod  1.7  1.7  1.9  3.8  7.3  10.4  11.2  12.3  3.1  3.0  3.8  4.0
Chuvashia  2.0  2.0  3.8  7.4  8.9  9.6  10.4  10.7  3.5  3.8  3.1  3.1
Tatarstan  1.9  1.9  2.1  5.0  8.5  9.4  10.4  11.8  4.5  4.8  4.2  4.2
Ulyanovsk  2.0  2.0  3.7  5.2  8.1  10.0  10.7  11.2  3.6  3.1  3.3  3.1
Samara  1.4  1.5  2.4  4.8  11.6  13.7  15.2  17.0  5.7  5.2  5.8  5.8
Saratov  2.1  2.1  3.4  8.6  13.1  14.8  15.7  16.3  5.3  4.5  3.6  3.6
Volgograd  2.0  2.0  2.5  5.7  13.7  15.7  16.8  18.1  6.7  6.9  4.9  4.8
Astrakhan  2.1  2.1  3.5  6.7  11.5  12.8  13.3  13.9  5.8  4.9  4.4  3.2
Memno  Item
RussianFederationb/  N/A  N/A  N/A  7.2  11.5  13.0  14.1  15.1  5.0  4.7  4.2  4.2
MoscowCityandOblast  N/A  N/A  N/A  19.8  25.8  31.3  37.0  42.8  12.9  13.4  14.0  13.5
Source: Goskomstat,  Regionyi Rossii, Vol. 2, 1997, Goskomstat, Sotzialno-Ekonomicheskoe Polozhenie Rossii, January, 1998 and
authors' calculations.
a' As of October  1, 1997.
b/ Excluding St. Petersburg City and Oblast and Moscow City and Oblast.Appendix  Table  8: Main Characteristics  of Active  Joint  Ventures
and Foreign  Investment  in Volga Regions
Active Joint Ventures
Flow of Total Foreign
Number of  Real Volumie of  Investment,
Regions  Total Number  Employees ('000)  Production (M.  (USD per Capita)
Emploees  (000)  1990 Rubles)
_1995  |  1999617_799  1996  1995-96  a/  i  1997
Tver  43  40  0.9  0.9  17  27  52  4
Yaroslavl  85  91  1.4  13.3  33  167  0.3  b/  16
NizhniNovgorod  115  140  7.0  7.6  420  252  31  c/  39
Chuvashia  56  59  0.8  0.6  12  18  1 b/  0.03
Tatarstan  125  139  6.6  7.3  323  241  61  185
Ulyanovsk  30  22  0.4  1.7  4  78  0.2  2
Samara  122  122  4.5  6.3  102  119  54  26
Saratov  82  82  4.0  4.8  171  141  10  9
Volgograd  157  152  3.8  4.6  89  138  16  10
Astrakhan  60  84  1.2  1.2  9  13  1  0.2
Memo Item
Russian Federation d/  6272  6303  223  283  6926  6156  N/A  26
Moscow City  6634  8067  90  146  2683  7945  N/A  820
Source: Goskomstat,  Regionyi Rossii, Vol. 2, 1997, Goskomstat,  Sotzialno-Ekonomicheskoe
Polozhenie Rossii, January  1998 and authors'  calculations.
a' Calculated  with  1996 regional  population  data.
bl  1995 data only.
£' 1996 data is for the capital city of the region only.
d/ Excluding  Moscow  City and St. Petersburg  City.Appendix Table 9: Changes in Average Real Monthly Wage, Employment and
Real per Capita Income in Volga Regions, 1990 - 1996
(percent)
Regions  M  hAverage  Real  Employment a  Real Per Capita
Monthly  Wage  _  Income
Tver  -22  -16  -11
Yaroslavl  -47  -14  -34
Nizhni Novgorod  -38  -9  -35
Chuvashia  -46  -11  -29
Tatarstan  -13  -11  -6
Ulyanovsk  -47  -12  -33
Samara  -17  -8  -17
Saratov  -41  -14  -29
Volgograd  -38  -9  -37
Astrakhan  -40  -14  -40
Memo Item
Russian Federation  -55  -12  -39
Source: Goskomstat, Regionyi Rossii, Vol. 1, 1997, Goskomstat "Rossiiskii
Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik 1997".
a/ Regional data is for the period 1990-1995.Appendix Table 10: Unemployment in-Regions
Unemployment  Number of Registered Unemployed
Region  Rate a/  (000's)
1995  1995  1996  1997 b/
Tver  8.0  14  20  10
Yaroslavl  11.5  61  46  19
Nizhni Novgorod  7.8  54  57  47
Chuvashia  9.6  48  44  24
Tatarstan  6.4  26  37  40
Ulyanovsk  7.8  23  21  15
Samara  7.3  33  58  64
Saratov  9.6  46  46  25
Volgograd  10.3  18  26  15
Astrakhan  13.1  23  24  17
Memo Item
Russian Federation  8.8  2327  2506  1999
Source: Goskomstat, Regionyi Rossii, Vol. 1 and Vol. 2, 1997, Goskomstat, Sotzialno-
Ekonomicheskoe Polozhenie Rossii, January, 1998.
a/  Registered and non-registered unemployed as percent of the economically active
population.
As of the end of December, 1997.Appendix Table 11: Changes in City Industrial Output and Employment, 1990 - 1996
Physical Volume of Industrial Production  Share of Workers  t
Capital Cities  (1990=100)  Employment (%)
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994 1 1995 1 1996  1990  1996
Tver  100  100  80  73  50  40  30  31  26
Yaroslavl  100  97  79  68  51  42  36  44  N/A
Nizhni Novgorod  100  102  101  105  72  70  67  44  35
Cheboksary  100  101  77  66  38  30  25  50  38 a/
Kazan  100  101  83  71  52  50  47  47  30 a/
Ulyanovsk  100  111  107  113  102  84  79  46  39 a/
Samara  100  98  96  79  58  51  36  43  33 a/
Saratov  100  103  88  85  46  30  21  41  N/A
Volgograd  100  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  41  35 a/
Astrakhan  100  103  98  81  60  47  33  34  25
Source: Goskomstat, Cities of Russian Federation, 1995, city case studies and city statistical
bulletins.
a/  1995 data.Appendix Table 12: Changes in Industry Shares Measured in Current Prices, 1990-1996
(percentage points)
Industrial  Sectors  Yaroslavl  Nizho d  Kazan  Samara  Astrakhan  Russia
Novgorod
Fuel and energy  complex  6.4  14.3  -4.8  29.6  14.3  27.1
Chemical  and petrochemical  2.4  0.1  12.6  -2.0  0.1  -0.6
Metallurgy  -0.5  -2.4  -0.1  -0.2  -2.4  1.8
Machinery  and metal  working  5.5  30.5  9.0  -10.2  30.5  -11.1
Forest  products  -5.0  -13.7  -1.8  -2.7  -13.7  -1.6
Construction  1.0  -1.9  1.7  -2.4  -1.9  0.8
Light industry  -12.8  -15.2  -11.6  -4.8  -15.2  -9.1
Food industry  2.0  -8.0  -7.7  -2.9  -8.0  -2.9
Other  1.2  -3.8  2.7  -4.4  -3.8  -4.3
Source: Calculations from 1990-96 enterprise database, as cited in Ivanov 1998b.Appendix Table 13: Changes in Telephones  and Automobiles  Possession  and Retail Trade,
1990 - 1996
l elephones  per lWUU  Automobiles per 1WCU
Residents  Residents  Percent Change in Real
Capital Cities  Per Capita Retail Trad
1990  1996  Percent  1990  1996  Percent  in Consumer Goods
Change  Change  and Services
Tver  80  111  39  54  112  107  -39
Yaroslavl  155  219  a/  41  47  87  86  N/A
Nizhni Novgorod  196  237  21  45  88  96  -71
Cheboksary  164  N/A  N/A  24  N/A  N/A  -35
Kazan  118  N/A  N/A  42  78 a/  85  6
Ulyanovsk  103  134 a/  30  53  87 a/  64  -35 a/
Samara  156  202 a/  29  68  116 al  71  -24 a/
Saratov  123  151  23  67  118  76  N/A
Volgograd  138  200  45  67  89  33  42
Astrakhan  116  165  a/  42  55  88  60  -68 a/
Source: Goskomstat, Cities of Russian Federation, 1995, city case studies and city statistical
bulletins.
!! 1995 data.Appendix Table 14: School Age Population and Pupils in 2nd and 3rd Shifts,
1990 and 1996
School Age Population as  Pupils in 2nd and 3rd Shifts as
Capital Cities  Percent of the Total  Percent of the Total
1990  1996  Percent  1990  1996  Percent
Change  Change
Tver  19.6  17.8  -9  33.0  35.0  6
Yaroslavl  20.5  17.7  -14  24.9  29.8 a/  20
Nizhni Novgoro  i  N/A  N/A  N/A  27.1  N/A  N/A
Cheboksary  25.9  23.9 a/  -8  21.2  28.2 a/  33
Kazan  N/A  20.7 a/  N/A  22.2  31.4  41
Ulyanovsk  24.8  23.5 a/  -5  27.8 b/  32.9 a/  18
Samara  20.7 b/  18.0  -13  32.9  37.2 a/  13
Saratov  19.8  18.3  -8  31.9  34.7  9
Volgograd  19.7  19.1  -3  26.3  32.1  22
Astrakhan  N/A  N/A  N/A  36.5  39.9  9
Source: Goskomstat, Cities of Russian Federation, 1995, city case studies and city
statistical bulletins.
a/ 1995 data.
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